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Abstract
Episode Based Payment Models and the Hospital Safety-net: An Evaluation of the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services’ Comprehensive Joint Replacement Bundled Payment Program
By
John Anthony Gravina
Advisor: Alexis Pozen, Ph.D.

Introduction
Payments for Healthcare services are increasingly being tied to clinical quality, patient
experience, health outcomes, and efficiency through value-based payment arrangements (VBP). VBP
presents a potential opportunity to reduce healthcare expenditures by requiring providers to take on
financial risk associated with the cost and quality of care, therefore aligning payment incentives with the
goals of providing higher quality and efficient care. As of 2020, 80 percent of Medicare payments had
some link to value. As the shift from paying for volume of services to paying for value has progressed,
focus has shifted to payment models, including episode-based payment models, that not only tie
payment to clinical quality and patient outcomes but do so while encouraging efficiency and provider
integration across multiple providers along the continuum of care. Episode-based payment models have
demonstrated the ability to reduce Medicare payments to providers without harming measures of
healthcare quality, but there is concern that these models may disadvantage safety-net providers and
the vulnerable patients that they serve. The following study examines the impact of a mandatory
Medicare episode-based payment program, the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR)
program, on average price-standardized episode payments, and whether that impact is different for
safety-net providers.

Methods
Medicare claims data from the Limited Data Set (LDS) standard analytical files (SAFs) from 20112018 were used to construct longitudinal episodes of care for lower extremity joint replacement
patients beginning with discharge for LEJR and extending 90 days post-discharge. A difference in
iii

differences (DID) approach was used to estimate whether the change in price-standardized payments
for applicable services post implementation of the CJR program in episodes originating at participating
facilities was significantly different in comparison to those originating at non-participating facilities.
Two-part logistic-linear DID models were used to estimate the change in payments separately for each
category of services. Analyses were then stratified by the safety-net burden of the anchor hospital,
measured using the percent of total inpatient days for Medicaid patients, the percent of Medicare
inpatient days for patients receiving supplemental security income, and the disproportionate share
hospital patient percentage. Analyses controlled for patient characteristics, characteristics of the
hospital providing the LEJR, along with MSA and Hospital level fixed effects.

Results
Average price standardized episode spending decreased 3.5% (p<.0001) more for episodes originating at
a CJR participating hospital as compared to episodes originating at hospitals in the control group. CJR
Payments for inpatient readmissions (-259, p<.0001), inpatient rehabilitation services (-328, p<.0001),
and professional services (-142, p<.0001) decreased more in episodes originating at CJR participating
providers compared to control. No statistical difference was found when stratifying the analysis by
quartile of safety-net burden.

Conclusion
These finding provide further evidence in support of episode-based payment models as an effective
method to generate reduced payments to providers of LEJR services. This evidence comes at a crucial
time, as Medicare, along with its advisors, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, are currently
engaged in planning the future of episode-based payment models within the Medicare program.
Importantly, safety-net burden was not found to impact the ability to generate payment reductions in
an episode-based payment model. The findings presented related to the ability of safety-net providers
to generate payment reductions are also timely and provide needed evidence at a time in which
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Medicare, MedPAC and The Innovation Center plan for the future of alternative payment models in the
Medicare program.
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Chapter I: Introduction and Background
The United States Healthcare system is often criticized for its costliness. As of 2020 the
healthcare system accounts for nearly 19 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product.1 In addition, the
Nation’s costliest public insurance program, Medicare, to run a deficit beginning in 2022 with program
expenditures expected to exceed revenues for the foreseeable future absent policy changes.2,3 Value
Based Payment presents an opportunity to reduce expenditures by requiring providers to take on
financial risk associated with the cost and quality of care, therefore aligning the payment incentive with
the goals of providing higher quality and efficient care. Importantly, the body of evidence supporting the
ability of value-based payment arrangements to do so, along with assessments of potential unintended
consequences, remains incomplete.
The following chapter provides a background on value-based payment models and safety-net
providers, and provides an overview of original research evaluating both the impact of a mandatory
episode-based payment model for lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR) surgery—the
Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model—on average Medicare payments, and whether
the impact was dependent on provider safety-net status. Subsequent chapters present a summary of
the historical context for healthcare reimbursement, review the current body of relevant evidence,
detail the methodology and results of the analysis, and discuss the limitations and policy relevance of
our findings. Chapter 2 provides a summary of the historical path from paying for volume to paying for
value, followed by a summary of the literature evaluating value-based payment methodologies in
Medicare. Chapter 3 provides a detailed methodological description of our evaluation of the impact of
the CJR model on Medicare payments, and our assessment of whether safety net hospitals generate
significantly different payment changes in response to the model compared to non-safety net facilities.
Chapter 4 presents the results of our analyses. Finally, conclusions drawn from our analyses, in the
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context of the body of evidence and historical background presented in chapter 2, limitations of our
analysis, policy implications and directions for future research are presented in chapter 5.

Significance and Basics of Value Based Reimbursement
Payers, led by Medicare, have begun to tie significant amounts of reimbursement to value,
rather than the volume of services provided. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
primarily through the Medicare program, has been instrumental in fostering this shift. CMS’ efforts to
implement payment reform have largely been driven by the CMS Innovation center (the Innovation
Center), previously known as the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation.4 The Innovation Center
was authorized in 2010 by the Affordable Care Act to identify ways to improve healthcare quality while
controlling costs in Medicare, Medicaid and the Children’s Health insurance Program (CHIP). Since its
incarnation, CMMI has launched and tested over 50 models, the majority of which have been proposed
and implemented after 2018.4 These experimental payment arrangements have a wide reach. For
example, between 2018 and 2022 models launched though the Innovation Center have impacted
reimbursement to 528,000 healthcare providers and health plans for services provided to nearly 28
million patients.5
In theory, the concept of value to which reimbursement is being linked can be defined as the
production of the maximum health benefit for the lowest possible cost.6 Operationally, overall health is
rarely measured directly in the context of value based reimbursement for healthcare. Instead, valuebased reimbursement models tend to tie reimbursement to health benefits demonstrated based on
performance or improvement on measures of clinical processes, health outcomes, or patient
experience. In doing so, value-based payment models measure dimensions of health benefit that are
either inherently or instrumentally valued. Health outcomes and patient experience are inherently
valued, as they are direct measures of components of health benefit. Clinical processes are
instrumentally valued as they represent intermediate practices believed to be, based on available
2

clinical evidence, useful in generating health benefits.6 As mentioned, health benefit is only half of the
value equation, the other being the cost associated with the production of the health benefit. These
costs should include the production costs to the provider, the administrative costs to the payer, and the
opportunity costs to the patient. In practice, the measurement of the cost portion of the value equation
generally represents the cost to the payer and will vary depending on the payment model. Total cost of
care models generally measure the total health expenditures for a patient over a period of time, and
average those costs across all applicable patients being treated by a provider. On the other hand, an
episode-based payment model may instead measure the average cost of defined episodes of care.
Agency theory can be an informative framework to assess payment arrangements for healthcare
services. in understanding the theory behind various payment arrangements. Agency theory describes
the behavior of agents when a task is delegated to that agent from a principal. Payment mechanisms for
healthcare services, viewed through this lens, represent the delegation of the task of improving health
to the healthcare provider, who represents the agent. The principal-agent relationship in healthcare is
more complex than in some other applications, as providers are generally agents for both the patient
and the patient’s health insurer. In both relationships, the expectation is that the provider will act to
maximize their net-income and to meet the expectations of the principal.6 Value-based reimbursement
seeks to create an incentive structure in which meeting the expectations of the principal, which is
theoretically to produce the maximum health benefit for the lowest cost to the payer and patient, is in
line with the provider’s efforts to maximize net income.
In practice, value-based payment arrangements come in many forms. The Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) developed the Alternative Payment Model (APM) framework to describe
the progression of payment reform efforts as they move from volume-based reimbursement to valuebased reimbursement. The APM framework groups payment models into four categories: Category 1Fee for Service with No link to Quality and Value, Category 2-Fee for Service Linked to Quality and Value,
3

Category 3-Alternative Payment Models built on Fee-for-service Architecture, and Category 3Population-based Payment. These categories exist along a continuum of the risk that is required to be
borne by the provider. 7 This risk creates the incentive structure mentioned above. There are two types
of risk that can be created by payment models. The first is management risk. Management risk, also
sometimes referred to as clinical or performance risk, are potential monetary gains or losses that can be
reasonably managed and affected by providers when the model is designed appropriately. The second
type of risk is insurance or actuarial risk. Actuarial risk is the risk associated with spending or outcomes
associated with patients that are unusually expensive, similar to the risk born by most insurance
companies. In general, actuarial risk is not appropriate to be borne by individual providers and should be
left to large health networks or insurance plans. Instead, moving from one category to the next in the
APM framework results in an increased level of management risk intended to be borne by providers.
Table APM displays the four categories of the APM framework and examples of the type of payment
models that may exist in each category.7
Table 1: APM Framework

Category 1: No
Link to Quality or
Value

Category 2: Fee
For Service with
Link to Quality or
Value
Payments to support
Infrastructure and
Operations related to
quality or value

Traditional Medicare
Payments through the
Prospective Payment
Systems

Category 3: APMs
Built on Fee-forService
Architecture

Category 4:
Prospective
Population Based
Payment

Episode-based payment
models and retrospective
population based models
with Shared Savings

Capitated Arrangments

Pay-for-reporting
Programs

Pay-for-performance
Programs

Global Budgets
Episode-based payment
models and retrospective
population based models
with Shared Savings and
Shared Losses

Increased Management Risk
4

Integrated Finance and
Delivery Systems.

According to the Healthcare Payment Learning and Action Network, a public private partnership
convened by the Department of Health and Human Services to accelerate the proliferation of valuebased payment models, 80 percent of all Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) payments in 2020 were linked in
some way to clinical quality, outcomes, patient experience, which we will generally refer to as quality, or
value. Most payments that are linked to quality or value were subject to simple quality-based bonuses
or penalties (pay-for-performance). The move to value-based payment is not unique to the Medicare
program. In fact, payments made by non-Medicare providers tend to rely on value-based
reimbursement models at similar rates. Results from the same analysis, including 73 health plans, across
5 States, in addition to traditional (i.e. non Medicare Advantage) Medicare indicates that about 41% of
payments were tied to value through shared savings, shared risk, or population-based arrangements. 8
Furthermore, this represents a dramatic increase in a short period of time. A similar assessment
conducted in 2015, indicated that only 38% of payments were tied to value at that time.9
As the shift from paying for volume of services to paying for value has progressed, the system
has begun to focus on payment models that not only tie payment to clinical quality and patient
outcomes but do so while encouraging provider integration across multiple providers along the
continuum of care and efficiency. These efforts have largely come to rely on two types of alternative
payment models (APMs): episode-based payment models and population-based payment models.
Population-based payment models are models that hold providers accountable for the cost and quality
of care for a defined attributed population. Alternatively, episode-based payment models, often
referred to as bundled payment models, hold providers accountable for the cost and quality of care
provided for a defined episode of care that is generally triggered by utilization of a specific clinical
service. The episode often includes both acute and post-acute care, and includes costs associated with
care provided by a diverse set of providers.5 In both population-based and episode-based payment
models, these arrangements generally hold providers accountable for performance on measures of
5

healthcare quality. As of 2020, Roughly 41% of Medicare FFS payments were linked to value either
through an episode-based payment model that included shared savings or shared risk, or a populationbased payment model.8
CMS experimentation with episode-based payment models pre-dates the Innovation Center.
The Acute Care Episode model was implemented in 2009 across a small set of hospitals in the
Southwestern United States, and in some evaluations, but not all, was found to have generated
payment reductions.10 Researchers continued to explore the potential of episode based payment
models as a means to generate both cost savings and quality, particularly through analyses highlighting
significant payment variation in many procedures.11,12 The innovation center has now implemented
several episode based payment models of varying design. As these models have proliferated, a body of
evidence has begun to develop demonstrating their ability to generate payment reductions without
negatively affecting quality. 13–19 In general, these models have been found to generate modest savings
to the payer but often relied on either small samples of providers or evaluated models with voluntarily
participation which raises the concern of selection bias.13,18,19 Evaluations of the Bundled Payment for
Care Improvement Initiative (BPCI), have included a larger number of providers, but still in a voluntary
program.13 The CJR program, is both large in scope and mandatory for providers in selected geographic
areas, and therefore has provided researchers with a unique opportunity to assess the impact of
episode based payment models. As the CJR program has now been in effect for several years, it has
been demonstrated to be effective at generating payment reductions.14–17
Importantly, findings from across the spectrum of value-based payment models have raised
concerns related to unintended consequences. These consequences range from the potential for patient
selection related to clinical complexity to the impact on safety-net providers.16 The former has been a
major focus of study, and has been assess through CMS’ official evaluations. The latter represents a
significant gap in the literature. It has been demonstrated that safety-net providers perform more
6

poorly compared to non-safety net providers in terms of generating bonus payments or avoiding
penalties related to either spending or quality.20 Yet, the mechanism resulting in this disparity has not
been widely explored.

Safety-net Providers
Providers that provide care to a disproportionate amount of disadvantaged patients that tend to
be uninsured or covered by the Medicaid program, often referred to as safety-net providers, experience
a unique set of challenges related to both quality and costs. Safety-net providers tend to treat more lowincome patients and racial/ethnic minorities.21 While these hospitals are eligible for Federal subsidies,
those with the highest safety-net burden have often been found to be more financially fragile. For
example, Gilman et al. found that hospital margins in California were lower among hospitals in the
highest quartile of Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Patient Percentage compared to all other
hospitals.22 Popescu et al., noting that several definitions of safety net status exist, examined three
measures of safety net burden, the DSH Patient Percentage, a definition based on the level of
uncompensated care, and a measure based on Medicaid and Uninsured caseloads. The authors found
that the latter two measures were associated with lower operating margins while the DSH patient
percentage was not. Importantly, the authors did find that hospitals with higher DSH patient
percentages provided higher levels of charity care (i.e. care provided for which no reimbursement is
expected).21 Safety-net providers tend to treat less privately insured patients, which is also a significant
indicator of financial fragility. Manary et al. found that hospitals with higher percentages of privately
insured patients were more financially healthy, as measured by the Dupont system.23 Conversely, Oner
et al found that a higher proportion of payer mix attributable to Medicaid is associated with lower
margins.24
Diminished financial health, along with treating more vulnerable patients, has important
implications. Investment decisions are likely influenced by available resources, and therefore on average
7

providers with a higher safety-net burden may have limited ability to implement quality improvement
initiatives compared to non safety-net providers.25 This disparity in resources may be a factor driving
disparities in quality of care. Indeed, disparities in clinical quality and health outcomes exist between
safety-net providers and non-safety net providers. Both hospital safety-net status, and neighborhood
SES, has been found to be associated with increased risk of readmission.26,27 Coffield et al found that
patients being treated for hip fractures in safety-net hospitals had significantly longer lengths of stay
analyzing length of care for hip fracture patients.25 Hoehn et al. analyzed differences in cost,
readmissions, and mortality between safety net providers across nine surgical outcomes controlling for
differences in patient characteristics and procedure volume . The authors found that safety-net
providers had significantly worse mortality rates for 3 of the 9 measures, with no statistical difference
for the other 6 surgical procedures. Similarly, safety net providers were found to have significantly
higher readmission rates for 2 of the 9 procedures with no significant difference found for the other 7
procedures. Lastly, in all but 2 of the studied surgical procedures, safety-net providers were found to
have significantly higher costs.28
Systematic differences in cost and quality between safety-net providers and non-safety
providers has resulted in disparate performance in value-based payment arrangements between these
two groups. Safety-net providers have generally been less successful in the three major Medicare
hospital pay-for-performance (P4P) programs having been found to be more likely to be penalized in
Hospital Value Based Purchasing (HVBP) program, Hospital Readmission Reductions Program (HRRP),
and Hospital Acquired Conditions Reduction (HACRP)program.21,29 In addition, early evidence from the
CJR model, which is the subject of the analysis presented here, indicates that safety-net hospitals are
less likely to generate shared savings through the model.20 Importantly, the drivers of this disparity
remain unclear. The disparity may be due to a difference in ability driven by the aforementioned lack of
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resources, differences in patient populations that are not accounted for by robust risk adjustment, or
structural elements in the design of the Value based payment arrangements.

Overview of the CJR Model
The Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) episode-based payment program, which is
the subject of our analysis, is a mandatory bundled payment program for lower extremity joint
replacement (LEJR) episodes among Medicare patients. The model was implemented in April of 2016
and originally applied to a random set of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) selected by CMS. LEJR
was a logical condition for CMS to target through a bundled payment program. These procedures occur
at high volumes, are high cost, and significant variation in spending and practice patterns are observed
between both providers and regions, making these procedures attractive candidates for episode-based
payment models.30,31 LEJRs account for the single largest cost to Medicare among costs attributable to
reimbursing for procedures.11 Furthermore, LEJRs are the most common surgical procedures performed
on Medicare beneficiaries, and Medicare is the single largest payer for these procedures.30,31 Miller et
al. found that price standardized payments for LEJRs varied by an estimated 73% between hospitals in
the highest-cost quintile and those in the lowest-cost quintile after adjusting for clinical and
demographic differences and reliability.32 Hussey et al. explored this variation further, finding that after
price standardization, spending for LEJR episodes extending 30 days after discharge was driven by both
hospital and regional differences. In partitioning the variance in payments, the authors found that nearly
30 percent of the variation in episode spending was regional.33
CMS originally selected 67 MSAs for participation in the model. In selecting these MSAs, CMS
first excluded counties without an urban core or with urban cores having populations of less than
50,000, and MSAs that had less than 400 LEJR episodes that were not already captured in the Bundled
Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) program, a concurrent but voluntary Medicare value-based
payment model. From the remaining 171 eligible MSAs, CMS used a stratified random sampling
9

methodology to select 67 participating MSAs. MSAs were stratified for purposes of randomization based
on the quartile of average historical episode payment, and whether the MSA was above or below the
median MSA population size. CMS then oversampled MSAs in the top two quartiles of episode spending.
Post-randomization, most Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) hospitals in selected
MSAs were required to participate. Hospitals that were LEJR episode initiators in Models 2 or 4 of BPCI,
or participants in BPCI model 1 were excluded from participation regardless of MSA selection.31
The CJR model is a mandatory retrospective episode-based payment model that holds providers
accountable for the quality and cost of care for LEJR episodes. CJR episodes, for the first five years of the
model, were defined as an episode of care for a Medicare fee-for-service beneficiary beginning with
admission to an IPPS hospital, subject to defined exclusion criteria, resulting in a discharge that is paid
under MS-DRG 469 (Major Hip and Knee Joint Replacement or Reattachment of Lower Extremity with
Major Complications or Comorbidities) or MS-DRG 470 (Major Hip and Knee Joint Replacement or
Reattachment of Lower Extremity without Major Complications or Comorbidities) and extending 90 days
post discharge. The hospitalization triggering the episode is referred to as the anchor hospitalization,
and the hospital at which the anchor hospitalization occurs is referred to as the anchor hospital.
As CJR is a retrospective model, providers are initially paid via Medicare’s standard payment
methodologies (e.g. Acute Care Hospitals receive normal payments through the IPPS for inpatient care,
and the Outpatient Prospective Payment System for outpatient care). Anchor hospitals are provided
with a target price prior to each performance year. Target prices are calculated separately for each
provider, DRG, and fracture status. The target prices represent the expected episode spending for each
provider, discounted to generate savings, and were calculated based on a blend of hospital historical
spending and regional spending. The discount depends on both the level of achievement on quality
metrics, and whether the hospital will be receiving a reconciliation payment or be responsible for a
repayment to Medicare. The regional component of target prices was phased in over time, while the
10

hospital specific was phased out over time. In performance years 1 and 2 the target prices were based
on a blend of 2/3 hospital specific spending, and 1/3rd regional spending. In performance year 3 the
regional proportion was increased to 2/3rds. Beginning in year 4 target prices were fully dependent on
regional benchmarks. After each performance year, CMS calculates episode spending including all Part A
and B payments across all providers involved in caring for the patient, except for a defined set of
services that are explicitly excluded. The list of excluded Medicare Part B services and inpatient
readmissions by DRG is provided in Appendix A. For each hospital, average episode payments are then
compared to the applicable target price, discounted for quality performance and
repayment/reconciliation.
To determine quality performance, anchor hospitals are measured on two mandatory quality
metrics: Risk-standardized Complication Measure for Elective Primary Total Hip Arthroplasty and/or
Total Knee Arthroplasty and the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems
(HCAHPS) Survey Measure. The former measures the rate of complications while the latter measures
patient experience. Hospitals are awarded between one and ten points depending on their performance
decile for the complications measure and between one and eight points depending on their
performance decile for HCAPHS. Providers that perform below the thirtieth percentile are awarded zero
points, while providers performing in the top decile earn the maximum number of points. Providers can
earn additional points for improvement—a maximum of 1.8 points—and for submitting voluntary
patient reported outcome and risk variable data—two points. Points are summed to calculate a
composite quality score. Providers are then assigned to one of four quality performance groups: 31
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Table 2: CJR Clinical Quality Performance Groups

Quality Category

Clinical Quality Score (CQS)

Below Acceptable

<5

Acceptable

5 - 6.9

Good

6.9 - 15

Excellent

>15

If average episode payments are below the discounted reconciliation target price and the
provider earns a composite quality score of at least 5, then the provider earns a reconciliation payment
representing the provider’s portion of shared savings. If average episode payments are above the
discounted repayment target price then the provider is responsible for a repayment to Medicare
representing the provider’s portion of shared losses. Both shared savings and shared losses are capped.
Table Disc presents the regional/hospital specific blend, the range of discount factors, and the shared
savings/shared losses limits in each of the first 4 performance years.31 As an example, in performance
year 2, an anchor hospital achieving the highest level of quality, would receive reconciliation payments if
average episode spending was below the target price discounted by 1.5%, and would be responsible for
shared losses if average episode spending is above the target price discounted by .5%. If average
episode spending falls in between these two discounted target prices the provider would neither be
eligible for shared savings nor responsible for shared losses.
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Table 3: CJR Benchmark Blend, Discount Factors, and Shared Savings/Loss Limits

Performance
Year

Regional/Hospital
Specific Blend

Reconciliation*
Discount

Repayment*
Discount

Loss / Savings Limit

1.5% - 3.0%

No risk

None / 5%

1.5% - 3.0%

0.5% – 2.0%

5% / 5%

1.5% - 3.0%

0.5% – 2.0%

10% / 10%

1.5% - 3.0%

1.5% - 3.0%

20% / 20%

Regional: 1/3
1
Hospital: 2/3
Regional: 1/3
2
Hospital: 2/3
Regional: 2/3
3
Hospital: 1/3
4

All Regional

*Exact discount is dependent on achievement on quality metrics

Overview of Study
Using claims data from the Medicare Standard Analytical Files from 2011-2018, this study
evaluates the effect of the CJR program on price standardized average Medicare payments for Lower
Extremity Joint Replacement (LEJR) episodes by comparing the difference in payments to participating
facilities to non-participating facilities before and after the implementation of the program.
Furthermore, the study assesses whether any observed differences in the change in average episode
payments between treatment and control varies based on three measures of safety-net status: the
percent of Medicare days at the anchor hospital attributable to patients receiving supplemental security
income (the SSI percent), the percent of total days that are attributable to Medicaid beneficiaries (the
Medicaid percent), and Disproportionate Share Hospital Patient Percentage (DSH patient percent),
which is calculated as the sum of the SSI percent and Medicaid percent. The analysis employs the
difference-in-differences technique to determine the difference in the change of payments in
participating facilities in relation to changes in those providers that are not participating in the CJR
program.34 The same model is then fit separately for providers in each quartile of each measure of
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safety-net status, and a Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference model is used to determine the statistical
significance of any observed differences between strata.

Specific Aims
The specific aims of this analysis and the associated hypothesis for each aim are:
Aim 1
To assess the impact of CJR participation on Medicare payments for inpatient care, physician services,
skilled nursing, inpatient rehabilitation, and home health care for episodes originating in participating
versus non-participating hospitals.
Hypothesis 1: Overall average episode payments have decreased significantly more at
participating hospitals compared to non-participating hospitals.
Hypothesis 1a: Payment reductions are most pronounced in the institutional post-acute setting.
Aim 2
To assess the impact of safety-net status through stratification of episodes by the Medicaid percent, SSI
percent, and the DSH patient percentage at the hospital in which the episode originated, on the change
in payments associated with the CJR program.
Hypothesis 2: The difference between treatment and control is diminished among episodes
originating at providers with higher levels of each measure of safety-net status.

Theoretical Framework
The proposed analysis is based on the structure, process, outcomes framework (SPO). The SPO,
also known as the Donabedian model, was first introduced by Avedis Donabedian in 1966 as a
theoretical model of the production of healthcare quality.35 In the years since, the Donabedian model
continues to be the dominant theoretical model of health care quality in health services research. The
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framework emphasizes a systems-level approach to understanding the determinants of healthcare
quality.36
The Donabedian model asserts that the quality of healthcare and its determinants can be
grouped into three dimensions: Structure, Process and Outcomes.35 Structure refers to the context in
which care is delivered, as well as the resources used to facilitate that delivery. Structure includes
human and non-human capital, including staff, and equipment. It also includes systems, both formal and
informal, that influence care delivery, such as health care financing systems, and clinical guidelines and
policies.37 Process refers to the actual delivery of care, and other interactions between providers and
patients. Finally, outcomes refer to clinical measures of patient health status, such as mortality,
functional status or complication rates. Donabedian’s model posits that structure influences process,
which in turn influences outcomes.35,37 Donabedian’s model has since been built upon many times. One
important modification has been the extension of the SPO to include healthcare costs.37 This extension
lends credence to the application of the SPO framework to an analysis of both costs and quality.
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Figure 1: The Donobedian Model
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The CJR program is an example of a structural constraint, as it influences the way in which
healthcare is financed. The SPO framework posits that such a constraint may influence the way in which
providers deliver care, which may then have an impact on clinical outcomes and the cost of care
provided. While we are not directly measuring the cost of care provided in this analysis, we are using
Fee-for-Service payments from Medicare to providers as a proxy for these costs. Specifically, when
provider reimbursement is tied to a measure of average episode payments, they may be incentivized to
take measures to lower those payments. The concern is that in doing so, the provider withholds care
that is costly but necessary. To alleviate this concern, the CJR program also holds providers accountable
to minimum quality standards.38
16

Impact
This study leverages the mandatory nature of the CJR program to add to the body of literature
evaluating whether episode-based payment models are an effective means to reduce payments. While
the impact of this model has been studied, validating those results using slightly different methods and
data is valuable. First, this analysis draws from claims data for roughly 5% of the Medicare population.
Analyses employ both hospital and MSA level fixed effects wherever possible, allowing us to control for
differences in payments attributable to systematic differences between markets and providers that
were not otherwise measured. Furthermore, our results account for clustering of standard errors at the
hospital level, as episodes originating at the same hospital are most likely not independent. Next, we
take a different approach to controlling for clinical complexity, adjusting for complexity based on
Heirarchical Condition Category (HCC) count rather than the HCC score model, which has been validated
for the general Medicare population but not within subsets of patients sharing specific Diagnoses.39 The
use of HCC count should ameliorate concerns related to the validity of the HCC score within clinical
subsets of the Medicare population.
Analyses of the CJR model also have important benefits as compared to analyses of other
episode-based payment models. The mandatory nature of the CJR program, and the inclusion of only a
subset of national providers creates a natural treatment and control group. This model is therefore well
suited for the use of quasi-experimental techniques. Such techniques may allow for a reasonable
reproduction of the counterfactual and therefore improve the ability to make causal inferences.16 In
addition, mandatory participation reduces concerns related to selection bias, as initially, providers that
believed they could reduce payments could not opt into the program, and providers that felt they would
be unable to modify behavior and reduce payments or that performed poorly early in the program could
not simply opt out or leave the program.
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Next, alternative payment models are proliferating across both payers and service lines.
Additional models are currently being tested in Medicare for other clinical conditions. For example,
Medicare has since finalized a proposal to implement an episode-based payment program for Radiation
Oncology services. In addition, commercial payers have followed the Medicare’s lead, and begun tying
reimbursement to episode-based payment models. As mentioned above, an estimated 43% of
commercial payments are now tied to either episode-based or population-based models.8 While these
results may not be fully generalizable to non-Medicare populations, they can certainly add to the
current body of evidence to guide model design in other settings.
Importantly, our analysis will provide valuable insight and detail related to the comparably
poor performance of safety-net providers when participating in value-based reimbursement models.
Safety-net providers have been found to generate shared savings at lower rates than non safety-net
providers when participating in episode-based payment model.20 This is in line with evidence from payfor-performance programs that have generally found that safety-net providers generate fewer quality
based bonuses, when they are available, and are penalized at higher rates in penalty only programs.21,29
While this disparity has been observed, the mechanism driving the disparity has not been fully explored
in the literature. As Medicare continues to proliferate models, and advisory organizations such as the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) consider the most appropriate path forward, and
the role of alternative payment models for safety-net providers, this study will provide essential
evidence to ensure that value-based reimbursement is the appropriate mechanism to achieve health
systems goals.
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Chapter 2. Historical Perspective and Summary of Evidence
The shift to value-based payment did not begin with the affordable care act and the
proliferation of value-based payment models. This shift is instead the result of a gradual change from
volume or cost driven methods of reimbursement, which provide a strong incentive towards
overutilization and higher spending, to methods that instead reimburse a predetermined amount based
on an episode of care within care settings, and finally to implementation of models that tie payment to
value. The following chapter provides a brief history of healthcare reimbursement, paying particular
attention to describing the major milestones that have resulted in our current focus on expanding valuebased payment methods. Then, the chapter discusses the current body of evidence evaluating the three
most common methods currently employed to link reimbursement to quality or value—pay-forperformance, episode-based payment, and population-based payment—and a discussion of potential
unintended consequences that have been explored in the literature.

Historical Roadmap to Value Based Reimbursement
The predominant method of reimbursement in the United States is fee-for-service (FFS).40 FFS
reimburses providers based on the volume of services or procedures rendered. The price paid for each
unit of service is determined by a fee schedule that is either negotiated or administered. Such a system,
which is a form of retrospective reimbursement, requires providers to bear very little financial risk,
because payments are adjusted based on the cost of care provided. As services increase, so do both
costs, and payments.41 In general, payment methods can be understood as contracts between a
principal and agent, in which the principal is attempting to induce a certain behavior from an agent. FFS
Reimbursement is an example of a piece-rate payment, in which an agent is reimbursed based on the
unit of creation by some principal. Compensation, therefore, is directly related to effort, and provides a
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powerful and transparent performance incentive for the agent. Piece-rate reimbursement can align
incentives well between the agent and the principal when the unit of creation (i. e., the service or item
for which the agent is being reimbursed) is both easily understood and easily measured. On the other
hand, in situations where the monitoring, measurement, or understanding of the agent’s actions is
difficult, as it is in healthcare, the principal may be exposed to abuse. Specifically, the agent may be
induced to provide more than the minimum necessary level of services to achieve the goals set out by
the principal.42 FFS reimbursement is often considered as a potential driver of the US cost-quality
disparity. The Society of General Internal Medicine’s National Commission on Physician Payment Reform
has proposed that fee-for-service reimbursement is the most important cause of high health care
expenditures in the United States.43 Opponents of fee-for-service reimbursement argue that the
incentive created by such a system is to increase the quantity and intensity of services.41 Research on
fee-for-service reimbursement has found that this incentive does exist in some cases. Gaynor and
Gertler studied the impact of compensation arrangements with increased revenue sharing on physician
effort, measured as physician visits, and found that moving from compensation unrelated to
productivity to a model purely based on productivity would more than double physician output in an
average sized group practice.44 Epstein et al. found that physicians reimbursed through fee-for-service
prescribed significantly more tests, and more high-cost, high profit tests, than a cohort of pre-paid
physicians.45 Ransom et al. compared the performance of gynecological surgical procedures among
physicians before and after a change from FFS reimbursement to a capitated reimbursement
arrangement. The authors found that the switch to capitation resulted in a statistically significant 15%
reduction in surgical procedures after the move to a capitated arrangement.46 A later study employed a
nationally representative household based data set to assess differences in surgery rates between
patients whose specialists were reimbursed via FFS as compared to capitation. The author found that
specialists in FFS reimbursement arrangements had surgery rates 78% higher than those in capitated
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arrangements.47 Davidson et al. and Miller and Luft et al. found that in the context of managed care,
capitated arrangements resulted in reduced physician visits, and hospital utilization respectively48,49
Concerns with the FFS incentive structure, and the role these incentives play in increasing health
care costs, were a major driver in the movement towards Managed Care Organizations (MCOs). 41 The
Nixon administration attempted to foster the growth of Managed care through the HMO act of 1973,
but specifically in the form of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), but it wasn’t until the
regulation of HMOs was relaxed to allow for-profit HMOs, successful legal challenges against
prohibitions by the American Medical Associations on the corporate practice of medicine, and the end
of rate-setting practices in which States set payment rates for healthcare services that the proliferation
of MCOs exploded in the 1980s and 1990s.50,51 These organizations experimented with other means of
reimbursing providers, such as capitation. Capitation refers to a flat payment per patient per timeperiod (generally per month). This amount is not adjusted based on the intensity of services provided,
and the provider is tasked with providing care while constraining costs within their payment. Such a
payment model requires providers to bear significant financial risk. If they remain within their “budget”
are free to keep the difference, but those that spend outside of their budget must cover those costs
with their own money.41 While FFS incentivized increased volume of services, capitated payments
incentivize providers to treat healthy patients and provide as few services as possible, thus minimizing
costs. In addition to experimenting with payment methods, MCOs also implemented controls on the
utilization of healthcare services, such as empowering primary care physicians to be gatekeepers to
specialty care, limiting networks, and requiring prior authorization for certain tests or treatments.52 The
movement to MCOs resulted in public backlash, as the public began to fear that quality and access were
suffering.41,53 The public voiced concerns related to the management of their healthcare by large
organizations rather than physicians, and the potential for their care to be rationed. The medical
profession was a major driver of this backlash. Physician’s raised concerns regarding reductions in the
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time available for each patient visit, prohibitions placed on physicians discussing treatment options with
patients before prior authorization of the treatment, and inappropriate reductions in the availability of
inpatient care though many of these concerns are not supported by evidence.54 Overall, there is mixed
empirical evidence on whether the managed care of the time period resulted in reduced quality of care
or patient access to appropriate care. Managed care was associated with reduced length of stay in the
inpatient setting but, no clear pattern of overall worsened quality of care for managed care beneficiaries
was found. The findings suggest that depending on the clinical condition of the patient and the design of
the plan, managed care arrangements produced better or the same care for some and worse care for
others. The same was largely true of the evidence exploring both access and patient experience.55
In 1983 the Medicare program implemented the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS).41
Prospective payment systems (PPSs) take a different approach to cost control. Instead of paying per
patient, prospective payment systems pay a set rate per inpatient episode. These payments are adjusted
based on the diagnosis of the patient, but do not differ based on the patient’s length of stay.41 This
change was a shift in the unit of payment.6,10 Evidence related to the impact of the prospective payment
system on the quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries is dependent on the outcome being
measured. In general, studies examining changes in broad measures of clinical outcomes such as
readmissions and mortality have not found significant worsening in either measure post PPS.56 While
broad clinical outcomes did not change, evidence indicates that there may have been some adverse
effects of the PPS, including an increased likelihood of patient’s being discharged in an unstable
condition, and in patient dependency level at discharge.56,57 Importantly, the implementation of the PPS
provides clear evidence that changes in payment methods can drive changes in practice patterns and
care setting. After implementation of the PPS the discharge rate for Medicare beneficiaries fell, while
the proportion of beneficiaries discharged to SNFs or with home health services increased.56 In addition,
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the PPS resulted in a decrease in average length of stay, but it is unclear whether this is due to the
admission of healthier patients or a reduction in the intensity of admissions or treatment.41,58,59
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, concerns raised by the Institute of Medicine, along with public
perception of the effects of managed care on quality and access resulted in an increased focus on health
care quality. The landmark report To Err is Human was published in 1999, highlighting the human and
financial impact of medical errors in the U.S. The IOM estimated that a striking 44,000-98,000 individuals
die in hospitals died in hospitals each year due to medical errors. The report noted that predominant
third-party payment systems fail to create incentives for health care organizations to improve patient
safety. The report included recommendations to improve the safety of healthcare over the subsequent
ten years. While a full summary of these recommendations is outside the scope of this work, included in
those recommendation was the creation of a national mandatory reporting system for the collection of
data related to adverse events in the healthcare setting, the development and support of voluntary
reporting efforts, and the suggestion that public and private purchasers provide incentives to health
care providers to demonstrate improvements in patient safety.60 A subsequent IOM report published in
2001, Crossing the Quality Chasm, expanded the focus of To Err is Human from patient safety to overall
quality, and highlighted serious deficiencies in the quality of care provided by the U.S. healthcare system
including over-provision of services to some patients, under-provision of services to others, along with
the aforementioned preponderance of medical errors.61 Later that same year, CMS announced The
Quality Initiative to accomplish the joint goals of empowering consumers with quality of empowering
consumers to make informed care decisions using quality of care information, and stimulating and
supporting provider’s quality improvement efforts.62 The Quality Initiative would give rise to the
Reporting of Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update (RHQDAPU) program, which has since
been renamed the Inpatient Quality Reporting (IQR) program, after the Medicare Modernization
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 tied voluntary reporting of
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defined quality measures to annual payment updates.63 The RHQDAPU program initially required
participants to submit data on ten measures of healthcare quality. Hospital’s that did not submit
complete data received a 0.4 percentage point reduction in their annual Medicare payment update,
which increases Medicare payments each year to account for increases in prices.64 While the percentage
of payment tied to successful reporting was small, the RHQDAPU program, which is an example of a Payfor-Reporting program represented a significant step in the move to paying for value, as it tied a portion
of reimbursement to the submission of data on clinical quality, processes, and later outcomes. The
program, now referred to as IQR, has since grown to require submission of 57 measures, and hospitals
that do not meet submission requirements risk losing one quarter of their annual payment update.63
In the late 2000s, Pay-for-performance (P4P) both public and private payers began
experimenting with tying payment to performance related to clinical quality, health outcomes, and
patient expericen.40 Under pay-for-performance arrangements providers are held accountable not only
to submission requirements, but to their performance on the measures for which they are submitting
data. Pay-for-performance is most often implemented as a standard FFS payment, or prospective
payment, with a supplemental performance-based component (incentive). In such an arrangement,
providers continued to be pay based on volume. At the end of the payment period, the provider is then
paid a bonus, or assessed a penalty, based on their performance on one or more measures of processes,
outcomes, or efficiency. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) implemented three major
P4P programs focused on hospital care: Hospital Acquired Condition (HAC) reduction program, Hospital
Value Based Purchasing (HVBP) Program, and Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP).65–67
Pay-for-performance programs represented a further step towards paying for value, but early Pay-forperformance programs originally held providers accountable for structural, process, or outcome
measures, but until recently rarely directly addressed costs. More recently, Medicare began including a
measure of comparative spending, Medicare Spending per Beneficiary, in the Hospital VBP program.
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The ACA also developed, tested, and implemented more complex models that health providers
accountable for the value of care (both costs and quality). In 2008, just prior to the passage of the
Affordable Care Act, Don Berwick and the Institute for Healthcare Improvement promulgated a series of
goals known as the triple aim: improving the individual experience of care, improving the health of
populations, and reducing the per capita cost of care. In setting forth these goals, Berwick noted that
quality improvement efforts generally focused on improving defined elements of site-specific care, and
rarely focused on addressing shortcomings in care across the patients care continuum.68 Furthermore,
P4P programs, prior to the Hospital VBP program, generally did not directly incentivize cost control. The
affordable care act invested in experimentation with population-based models (e.g. Accountable Care
Organizations) and episode-based payment models, primarily through the creation of the Innovation
Center, to reform the delivery system in a way that promoted integration across providers that serve
patients at varying points of the care continuum, while directly incentivizing efficient care delivery.69
While P4P remains a major component of the overall value-based payment landscape, CMS has
identified moving national spending into episode and population-based models as a priority.7

Can Value-based Payment Improve Quality while Maintaining or Reducing Costs?
The previous section provides an overview of the history behind the movement towards valuebased payment in the U.S. The remainder of the chapter provides a discussion of the evidence base that
has developed examining the ability of value-based payment programs to meet their stated objectives.
First, we discuss the body of evidence that explores P4P models, their ability to incentivize
improvements in clinical quality and health outcomes, and whether they have been found to be cost
effective. Next, we discuss the bodies of evidence exploring population-based and episode-based
models and their ability to incentivize the efficient provision of care. Lastly, we discuss the evidence that
has proliferated regarding potential unintended consequences across these three categories of payment
models.
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Are P4P Programs able to improve quality while maintaining or reducing costs?
In general, the body of evidence surrounding P4P programs tends to be of low quality, and does
not support its effectiveness at generating substantial improvements in clinical quality or health
outcomes. A 2011 review of reviews summarizing the evidence from both the United Kingdom and
United States has found that performance based incentives (or penalties) resulted in modest
improvements on process measures and intermediate outcomes, but has been unable to find a clear
relationship between those incentives and outcomes.70,71 There is evidence that such incentive
programs, in the physician setting, tend to reward those that were already high performers.72 This raises
concerns that such programs could reinforce disparities in physician performance by redistributing
resources from providers with low performance, who would likely need to make investments in order to
improve their performance on measures of clinical quality, patient experience, health outcomes, or
efficiency, to providers with comparably higher performance.41 This review also noted that the body of
evidence was incomplete, and because of generally low methodological quality and a reliance on
observational methods, causal inferences based on the results were generally inappropriate.71
Subsequent research has generally found that performance-based incentives either do not impact, or
have a modest impact on clinical outcomes.73–77 In 2019, Mathes et al. reviewed the current body of
evidence related to the impact of P4P in the hospital setting. The author’s found that in general most
studies demonstrated little or no impact of P4P on patient outcomes such as mortality, or adverse
clinical events. In addition, the author’s found that the certainty of the evidence, as measured by the
GRADE working group grade of evidence, was very low for all included studies indicating very little
confidence in the effect estimates.78 Furthermore, even modest impacts have been found to be
temporary.74 There is a scarcity of research on the cost effectiveness of such payment models but those
studies that have examined both the cost and impact on quality of care have found that financial
mechanisms are not an efficient means of driving quality improvement.70
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Are Population-based Payment Models Able to Generate Savings while Maintaining or Improving
Quality?
Medicare’s major approach to population-based models is the Accountable Care Organization.
ACO’s are groups of providers that partner to form a new legal entity, and then contract with a payer to
manage and coordinate care while being held accountable to both the cost and quality of care for a
defined population.79 ACOs are then eligible to share in savings in relation to a pre-determined
benchmark level of spending or may be responsible for sharing in losses if they surpass that benchmark.
Shared savings are generally contingent on maintaining a defined level of quality. The methodology by
which individuals are generally assigned to ACO’s varies, but generally employ either retrospective
attribution based on utilization, or voluntary alignment in which ACO’s engage with patients directly to
confirm their relationship with ACO partners.10 Descriptions of each of Medicare’s major ACO models
and the evidence regarding their impact is provided below.
Pioneer Model
The Pioneer model was an early voluntary ACO demonstration that began in 2012. The model
was limited in scope, enrolling 32 providers nationwide. The model was aggressive, as it sought to hold
providers accountable for shared losses, while also making shared savings available, at a time when
ACOs, and value-based risk was still new to most providers. Importantly, the Pioneer model experienced
significant attrition in terms of participants, with only 9 ACOs remaining in the model for the entire
demonstration, likely due to the models voluntary design, a desire to avoid shared losses, and the start
of less aggressive ACO options prior to end of the demonstration.10,80 Despite high attrition, the Pioneer
Model did produce some useful evidence. McWilliams et al. found that Pioneer participation resulted in
savings of 1.2%, with savings being hire for ACOs that had high baseline spending or operated in high
spending areas. Interestingly, the authors did not find differential spending reductions in ACOs that
exited the program after the first year and those that did not.81 Schwartz et. al. used difference-indifferences to assess whether the first year of Pioneer participation was associated with differential
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changes in low-value services (i.e., services that provide limited clinical benefit), finding that
participation was associated with a 1.9% differential reduction in the quantity of low-volume services
provided, and a 4.5% differential reduction in spending on low-value services.82
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP)
The MSSP program was also launched in 2012, but did not require ACOs to share losses, and
included a much larger group of participants. In the first year of implementation there were 116 ACOs
participating in the MSSP program, growing to 560 ACOs in 2017. Currently there are 477 ACOs
participating in the model.83 Initially, the MSSP provided several options for participation, with the level
of downside risk varying.10 In 2019, MSSP was redesigned, with all tracks requiring ACOs to take
downside risk within defined time periods.84 The totality of evidence indicates that MSSP has generated
modest savings to Medicare. In addition ACOs that have spent more time in the program generally
produce more savings than newer entrants.10 McWilliams et al. employed differences in differences to
analyze the impact of the first two years of MSSP on payments and quality. The authors found that,
ACOs that began participating in 2012 generated differential savings of 1.4%, with ACOs joining in 2013
generating no significant savings. The impact of MSSP participation on quality was mixed, with
participation being associated with significant improvements in utilization of some preventive services,
but not others.85 A follow up study produced similar results, with ACO participation being associated
with 1.6% and 4.9% differential savings for ACOs with one year of participation and ACOs with three
years of participation, respectively. 86
Next Generation ACO Model
In 2016, CMS implemented the Next Generation (NextGen) ACO model, which was an attempt
to build on the lessons learned in MSSP and the Pioneer model, and to emphasize providers to take on
greater financial risk. The model allowed participants to earn up to 100% of shared savings and losses.
The official evaluation of the NextGen ACO model found that beneficiary spending decreased by 1.5% on
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average compared to the comparison group. Unfortunately there have been no independent, peer
reviewed attempts at evaluating the impact of this model.

Are Episode-based Payment Models Able to Generate Savings while Maintaining or Improving
Quality?
Episode-based payment models, sometimes referred to as bundled payments or case rates, vary
in structure, but share the intent of shifting financial risk from payers to another accountable entity by
either prospectively reimbursing a single amount or retrospectively comparing total spending to a target
price for episodes of care, which often including several care settings, rather than for services provided.
Episode based payment models have been implemented in several countries including the United
States, Denmark, Taiwan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden and England.87 The
Commonwealth fund reviewed episode-based payment models implemented across the globe and
identified several design elements that are common across episode based payment models. First, these
models define some accountable entity to which the financial risk associated with health care is shifted.
Next, the scope of covered services is determined, including the clinical condition of focus, if applicable,
the included providers, and the services provided by those providers to be included. Third, the episode
itself is defined. 87 This generally requires a triggering event to be defined, which determines the
beginning of the episode, as well as a description of the duration of the episode. For example, in the CJR
model, the details of which are discussed in chapter 1, the episode begins with a hospital stay for LEJR,
and ends 90 days after discharge from the hospital. Fourth, the payment mechanism must be defined. In
general, two broad types of payment mechanisms within episode based payment models exist:
prospective, and retrospective.87 Under a prospective payment mechanism, episode based payment
models would reimburse a pre-defined amount to the accountable provider. The accountable provider
may be responsible for distributing payments to any other providers included in the episode. A
retrospective arrangement instead pays fee-for-service or via some other standard reimbursement
methodology. Providers are then held accountable for the payers spending during that episode,
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primarily through comparison to a spending target and the sharing in savings or losses based on
exceeding or underspending in relation to that target. The level of risk must also be determined.87 For
example, accountable providers may be accountable for all or only a portion of overspending related to
the price target. In addition, the inclusion of risk-adjustment for either prospective payments, or pricetargets must be determined.87 Next, models generally link payment to quality in some way. Lastly,
models often include some description of the means by which payments, shared-savings, and shared
losses are distributed among participating providers other than the accountable provider.87
Prior to the passage of the ACA and the creation of the Innovation Center, CMS, it’s predecessor
the Healthcare Financing Administration (HCFA) and private payers had already experimented with
episode-based payment models. HCFA implemented a small episode-based payment model focused on
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgical episodes which ran from 1991 to 1996. The model, known
as the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center demonstration, included four hospitals, and paid
providers a single payment for all inpatient and physician services for heart bypass patients. The model
was found to have generated reduced costs to both participating hospitals and the Medicare system,
and a modest improvement in mortality rates (.5 percentage points).19 In the 2000s, several private
episode based payment models were tested. Geisinger Health System, which is a large integrated
healthcare system, and therefore has the ability to experiment internally with varying payment models,
implemented the ProvenCareSM model from 2006-2007. ProvenCareSM paid a single payment for preoperative, inpatient, and post-operative care within 90 days for all non-emergency CABG procedures.
Casale et al. found that hospital charges decreased by 5%, length of stay decreased by 16% and no
significant change in measured clinical outcomes.18 In 2008, the Healthcare Incentive Improvement
Institute (HCI3) launched the Prometheus bundled payment experiment in collaboration with several
payers. The Prometheus pilots were initially implemented in three pilot sites. The model defined
episode-based payment rates for 21 clinical episodes and was designed to pay a risk adjusted payment
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rate for each episode. The pilots failed to progress to the point where payments based on the bundles
were implemented and highlighted several practical barriers to implementation including the specifics
of episode definition, implementing the required quality measurement, determining the accountable
provider and engaging providers.88,89 In 2009 UnitedHealthcare implemented a prospective episode
based payment model for hospital care, hospice management, and case management for Oncology
episodes at five large Oncology practices. Newcomer et al. evaluated the model and found that
predicted total Medicare costs decreased by 34% with no statistically significant impact on quality
metrics.90
Acute Care Episode Demonstration
In 2009, just prior to the development of the Innovation Center episode-based payment models,
CMS implemented a small, bundled payment pilot known as the Acute Care Episode (ACE)
demonstration. The ACE demonstration bundled physician and hospital payments for inpatient
admissions across twenty-eight cardiac and nine orthopedic procedure based services. The ACE model
was a three year pilot including 5 hospitals.10 Using a difference-and-differences model, Medicare
evaluation contractors demonstrated that participating facilities achieved $585 in average episode
spending compared to non-participants, but these savings were partially offset by increases in postacute spending, resulting in net-savings of $319.91 Importantly, this evaluation did not explicitly confirm
that the parallel trends assumption was satisfied in their analysis. Indeed, a subsequent evaluation of
the acute care episode demonstration, which still relied on a DID approach, but employed matching
based on volume of services, risk-adjusted baseline and pre-enrollment Medicare spending, and clinical
outcomes to construct a comparable control group and confirmed parallel trends, found no significant
difference in episode spending, but was associated with a significant decrease in post-acute spending.92

31

Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI)
The savings demonstrated in the formal evaluation of the ACE model led CMS to implement the
Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) model. The model, which ran from October 2013September 2018, was implemented as a voluntary model with multiple options for bundle design.
Participating providers were able to choose from 48 different clinical episodes. In addition, some BPCI
models allowed both hospitals and physician groups to take financial risk, and expanded the duration of
each episode to include the period post discharge.10 Dummit evaluated Model 2 of the Bundled
Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative for lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR), which was
a retrospective episode based payment model and bundled spending for all services during an index
hospitalization for LEJR along with services provided 90-days post discharge. Awardees, or the main
participants, were then responsible for shared savings or shared losses depending on overall episode
spending relative to the benchmark. The level of shared savings or losses shared with downstream
providers, such as skilled nursing facilities or physician practices, varied and depended on contractual
agreements between the awardee and those providers. The authors found that participating facilities
reduced payments for LEJR episodes by an estimated $1166 more than control facilities, without a
significant observed difference in quality.93 A separate peer-reviewed analysis compared episode
spending and quality for medical conditions, rather than surgical, among early BPCI Model 2 participants
and non-participants, finding no meaningful difference in either spending or quality between the two
groups.94 The initial results from BPCI demonstrated both the potential of bundled payments to
generate savings when focused on LEJR episodes, and the opportunity that providers saw in
participating in such a model, with LEJR episodes being the most commonly selected episode in the CJR
program. The most recent evaluation of BPCI commissioned by CMS found that the program resulted in
payment reductions of roughly 3.1%. Spending reductions were not statistically different between
medical and surgical episodes for episodes originating at hospitals (3.9% vs. 2.6%). For episodes that
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originated at physician group practices, spending reductions were larger for surgical episodes (7.4%)
than for medical episodes (2.0%).95
Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement
The CJR program is a mandatory bundled payment initiative that applies to a random set of
Metropolitan Statistical areas.42 The CJR program holds providers accountable to both cost and quality
standards. Provider spending per episode, ranging from an inpatient admission for Total Hip or Total
Knee Arthroplasty and extending 90 days post discharge, is measured, and compared to pre-determined
spending benchmarks. Providers are paid fee-for-service throughout the year, and then subject to either
penalties or bonus payments based on their performance relative to these payment targets, and the
maintenance of a pre-determined level of performance on certain quality metrics.93
The opportunity provided by, and provider uptake of LEJR episode bundles in BPCI led CMS to
design implement a mandatory bundled payment model focused on LEJR episodes. The model, referred
to as the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model, was implemented as a demonstration,
and therefore required participation from providers in a randomly selected set of Metropoplitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs) to ensure that a control group could be constructed for evaluation. The early
years have already generated evidence. Finkelstein et al. examined data for episodes beginning after
April 1, 2016 and ending before December 31, 2016. To account for the exclusion of MSAs and Providers
from the model post randomization, the authors used an instrumental variable approach to assess the
early impact of CJR, using MSA random assignment to CJR as an instrument for participation in the CJR
program. The authors found that MSAs that were selected for assignment to the model were had lower
average institutional post-acute care utilization and spending than control MSAs, but did not find a
significant difference in total episode spending between the two groups.96 CMS’ official evaluations of
the CJR program have consistently demonstrated differential reductions in payments for episodes
originating at hospitals that were CJR participants in comparison to control. 14–17 These evaluations,
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which were conducted by The Lewin Group, and not peer reviewed, found that in the first two years of
the CJR program (2016-2020), average total episode payments decreased 3.3%, and 3.7% more in
treatment compared to control facilities for performance year 1 and 2 respectively.14,15 Beginning with
PY 3, evaluation was complicated by major changes in CJR policy, namely the reduction in mandatory
MSAs, and the conversion of some MSAs to voluntary opt-in status, and the removal of LEJR from
Medicare’s inpatient only list. CMS’ formal evaluation in PY3 found that across all providers that were
originally required to participate, payments decreased 3.7% more than in control facilities. This
differential reduction in payments varied depending on the participation status of the anchor hospital
(e.g. originally required to participate, required to participate after the 2018 policy changes, no-longer
required to participate but opted-in, no-longer required to participate but opted-in). Providers that
remained mandatory participants reduced payments for inpatient originating episodes by an estimated
5.3% more than control facilities. The evaluation did not provide separate estimates in PY 3 for those
facilities that either opted in or opted out.17 In PY4 the evaluators did provide separate estimates for
these groups. In PY 4 the evaluation estimated that mandatory participants reduced payments by 5.2%
more than control facilities, opt-in voluntary participants reduced payments by 3.2% relative to control,
and non-opt-in providers did not generate significantly different reductions from control after opting
out.16
Oncology Care Model
Since the implementation of CJR, CMS has continued to implement condition or disease specific
episode-based payment models. The Oncology Care Model (OCM) is a retrospective episode-based
payment model that provides for shared savings based on average episode spending and quality
performance for six month oncology episodes. The model also allows provides supplemental payments
per beneficiary to support care improvement processes. The commissioned evaluation of the OCM
through three and a half years found that the model has resulted in small reductions, roughly 1%, in
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total episode payments compared to a control group. Importantly, the evaluation found that savings
were on average greater in high-risk cases ($500 reduction) than in low risk cases ($151 reduction). As
with the BPCI program, the model has not generated overall savings to the Medicare program, as
supplemental payments and shared savings have generally been larger than episode payment
reductions.97

Unintended Consequences of Value Based Reimbursement models
Evidence related to unintended consequences associated with the shift to paying for value has
proliferated in recent years. There is some evidence that unincentivized elements of quality often suffer
when other elements of quality are incentivized, specifically in the context of P4P arrangements. This is
because providers are asked to produce multiple dimensions of quality (i.e. multitask). The theory of
multitasking suggests that when some outputs are incentivized while others are not, production of the
non-incentivized outputs will decrease.70,98 An analysis of the Advancing Quality scheme implemented
by the North West Strategic Health Authority in the United Kingdom found that the implementation of a
pay-for-performance program did not result in a significant decrease in mortality rates for incentivized
conditions, but did result in a significant increase in mortality rates for non-incentivized conditions. 70,99
Further evidence for multitasking has been reported in evaluations of a larger UK based P4P scheme, the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). Evaluations of this program initially found significant
improvements in quality dimensions that were measured through QOF, but the rate of improvement has
slowed over time. Furthermore, these evaluations have found that quality of care worsened for
dimensions that were not measured by QOF. Another important finding from these evaluations is that
physicians report that the elements required by the QOF began to influence their behavior during office
visits.100
In the context of episode and population-based models there has been significant concern that both
may disadvantage vulnerable patients, worsen health disparities, or disadvantage high-complexity
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patients. Dummit et al. compared changes in clinical complexity among BPCI participants and nonparticipants to assess whether participants were attempting to cherry-pick healthier, and therefore
lower cost patients. The authors found that BPCI model 2 participants tended to admit fewer patients
with post-acute care utilization compared to control, noting that this may signal a shift towards less
clinically complex patients. Importantly, the authors also found that other measures of clinical
complexity were not meaningfully different between treatment and control.93 These results were
supported by the findings of a second evaluation of BPCI model 2, which again found that BPCI
participants were less likely to provide LEJR to patients with prior skilled nursing facility utilization in
comparison to control hospitals.101 A second evaluation assessed a similar relationship for medical BPCI
model 2 episodes, and also found no significant difference in case-mix or clinical complexity changes
between BPCI participants and control.94 Patient selection has also been scrutinized in the context of
CJR. Barnett et al. employed a DID analysis to assess the impact of CJR participation on the percentage
of high-risk patients through the first 2 years of the program, defined as patients for whom there was an
elevated risk or spending, adjusting for hospital and patient characteristics. The authors did not find
evidence of a statistically significant difference in LEJR procedures performed on high-risk patients.102
Finkelstein et al. also assessed patient selection, evaluating the impact of CJR on patient age and
complexity. The authors did not find a statistically significant difference in age, Elixhauser comorbidity
index, or Charlson comorbidities due to CJR after the first year of the model.96
Evidence of cherry-picking in population-based models is mixed.10 An early analysis, analyzing cross
sectional data from 2011 found that ACO attributed Medicare beneficiaries were more likely than nonattributed beneficiaries to have higher incomes, and less likely to be black, disabled, or to have Medicaid
coverage.103 Conversely, a subsequent longitudinal analysis, analyzing data from 2012-2014, found that
physician groups participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) were more likely to treat
higher proportions of clinically high risk patients, and did not find a significant difference in the
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proportion of socially vulnerable patients as compared with non-participating physician groups.104 A
similar study employed difference-in-differences to estimate changes in vulnerable patients, defined as
the patient being black, low-income, dually eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid, or residing in zip
codes with higher poverty or unemployment rates, attributable to the MSSP program. The authors
found no statistically significant difference in changes in the proportion of vulnerable patients between
physician groups participating in ACOs and those that did not.105
The three major Medicare P4P programs provide some evidence that safety-net providers, and
subsequently their patients, may be disadvantaged by value-based payment models. Due to insufficient
risk adjustment, providers that treat a high proportion of vulnerable patients have been
disproportionately penalized in these programs. Gu. et al. found that the readmission rates used in the
Medicare HRRP are sensitive to dual eligibility for both Medicare and Medicaid, a common proxy for
socioeconomic status (SES).106 This finding has been echoed by analyses of the distribution of penalties
in the HRRP. Shih et al. have found that facilities serving a higher proportion of minority patients were
nearly twice as likely to be penalized.107 Joynt and Jha found that large hospitals, teaching hospitals, and
safety net facilities were all more likely to receive payment cuts under the HRRP.108 The propensity for
safety-net providers to These concerns have been mirrored in episode-based payment models. There is
evidence that safety-net providers are less likely to generate shared savings in episode-based payment
models, which raises concerns that such models could worsen existing financial disparities between
safety-net and non-safety-net providers, and negatively influence the ability of safety-net providers to
invest in care improvement. Navathe et al. compared the characteristics of hospitals that generated
shared savings in CJR to those that did not, finding that safety net providers, here defined as facilities in
the top quartile of DSH patient percentage, were less likely to generate shared savings after controlling
for other hospital characteristics.20 Evaluations of hospital characteristics associated with the ability to

37

reduce payments or costs, rather than generate shared savings, in episode-based payment models
represents a significant gap in the literature.
Lastly, Evidence from population-based models has demonstrated that disparities in access to valuebased payment models exist. Multiple studies have demonstrated that ACOs may be less accessible to
disadvantaged communities. Lewis et al. found that early in the development of ACOs, the organizations
were less likely to form and operate in areas with higher poverty rates.57 Yasaitis et. al found that
physicians practicing in Zip Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) where a higher proportion of the population
was black, living in poverty, uninsured, disabled, or with lower educational attainment were less likely to
participate in ACOs.109

Summary and Conclusions
The move to value-based reimbursement has shown no sign of slowing, as demonstrated by
CMS’ continued investment in pay-for-performance, episode-based, and population-based models. As
these models proliferate, and as MedPAC and CMS debate the next steps for value-based models in
Medicare, it is important to look to the current body of literature demonstrating the ability of these
models to generate savings while improving or maintaining the care provided to Medicare beneficiaries.
The current body of evidence indicates that pay-for-performance incentives are likely not an efficient
means to drive improvements in quality. Both population-based and episode-based payments have
demonstrated some success at generating modest savings to Medicare without deteriorating the quality
of care provided. Importantly, there is concern and some evidence of unintended consequences
associated with value-based payment models, such as the potential adverse impact on safety-net
providers and the patients that they serve.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods
Study Design and Overview
All analyses use a difference in difference framework, comparing changes in our dependent
variables across time in the treatment group to a control group not subject to the CJR bundled payment
program. The time of treatment will be January 1, 2016. The first category of primary dependent
variables are payments per episode for episodes that would be subject to the CJR reimbursement
methodology. The primary data source for all three analyses will be Medicare claims data obtained from
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Servcies.110
The unit of analysis for all analyses is the episode, as defined by the CJR program. The CJR
program defines an episode as beginning with an admission for total hip arthroplasty (THA) or total knee
arthroplasty (TKA), as indicated by the MS-Diagnosis Related Group (MS-DRG) on the inpatient claim and
continuing through 90 days post discharge. All payments for related services, as defined by CMS, during
this time-period will be included in the payments per episode. A list of excluded unrelated services by
ICD-9 and a list of excluded readmissions by MS-DRG are included in appendix A.

Data Sources
Data from several sources was combined for this analysis. Each data source is described below.
Limited Data Set (LDS) Standard Analytical Files (SAFs)
Our primary data source is Medicare Part A and Part B enrollment and claims data from 2011-2018
accessed through the LDS SAFs.110 The SAFs are a series of files available for each claim type used for the
purposes of Medicare reimbursement. There are 7 SAF files:
●
●
●
●
●

Inpatient Claims
Outpatient Claims
Skilled Nursing Facility Claims
Home Health Agency Claims
Hospice Claims
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●

●

Carrier Claims (professional claims and select organizational providers such as freestanding
laboratories, ambulance providers, free-standing ambulatory surgery centers and free-standing
radiology centers)
Durable Medical Equipment Claims

Collectively, these files contain claims from all provider types that are reimbursed by the Medicare
program including:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Acute Care Hospitals
Long Term Care Hospitals
Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities
Skilled Nursing Facilities
Home Health Providers
Hospice Providers
Ambulatory Surgery Centers
Physicians
Physician Assistants
Clinical Social Workers
Nurse Practitioners

While claims data for all Medicare beneficiaries is made available for the Inpatient, Outpatient, Skilled
Nursing Facility, Home Health and Hospice claim types, due to the magnitude of claims only a 5% sample
of beneficiaries is made available for the carrier and DME claim types as LDS SAFs. These claims data are
the source for episode payments, clinical risk factors, and service use. Claims data from each claim type
specific file were linked to create longitudinal beneficiary histories, or episodes, from hospitalizations
discharged for THA or TKA through 90 days post discharge. Institutional claims data for all Medicare
beneficiaries was available.
Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) LDS/Denominator File LDS
The MBSF LDS and Denominator file LDSs contain enrollment data and associated characteristics
for all Medicare beneficiaries in a given calendar year. These files are the primary source for beneficiary
demographic characteristics. In addition, the MBSF includes an indicator for those beneficiaries that are
included in the 5% sample of the Carrier and DME SAFs which was used to simplify identification of
beneficiaries with complete claims data.111
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Healthcare Cost Reporting Information System (HCRIS)
Data on facility level characteristics, costs, and financial indicators were extracted from the
Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS). Medicare certified facilities are required to submit
annual cost reports to their Medicare Administrative Contractor (MAC). These reports, available by
hospital and year in HCRIS, include facility level characteristics, utilization data, costs, charges, and
financial indicators.112
Provider of Services File
Further information regarding facility level characteristics was extracted from Medicare’s annual
provider of services file. These data included region, MSA, CMS region and hospital ownership. The
provider of services file consists of facility specific data collected by CMS regional offices, updated
quarterly, for Medicare participating providers.113
Medicare Prospective Payment System Regulations
Information regarding year specific base payment rates, and DRG weights was extracted from
Medicare Final Rulemaking (Final Rule). The Final Rules are published prior to the start of each payment
year on the Federal Register, and contain the annual regulations governing each Medicare payment
system.114

Study Population and Eligibility Criteria
The analytic dataset for this analysis consists of all total hip total knee replacement episodes
between 2011 and 2018 that meet the eligibility criteria for the CJR program, regardless of participation
in the program of the hospital in which the episode originates. The dataset is limited to only those
beneficiaries for which complete claims data is available (i.e. carrier and DME claims are available). For
2016-2018 these beneficiaries were identified in each year based on the 5% sample indicator from the
MBSF LDS. This information was not available for prior years, and therefore beneficiaries with complete
data were identified based on the presence of at least one claim for any beneficiary in either the carrier
or DME file for a given year.
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The treatment group for each analysis includes lower extremity joint replacement episodes
originating at hospitals that are were initially eligible and participating in the CJR program. Hospitals that
are located in a randomly selected cohort of 67 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) were required to
participate in the program. CMS selected these MSAs using stratified random sampling. Eight MSA strata
were defined based on average MSA historical episode spending, and MSA population. MSAs in the top
two quartiles of average episode spending were oversampled. Non-MSA counties and MSAs without at
least 400 eligible cases were excluded from the program. Within MSAs, facilities that chose to
participate in Model 1 or Models 2 and 4 of the Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI), a
separate CMS initiative, voluntary bundled payment program were ineligible for the program. For
Models 2 and 4, only those participating for lower extremity joint replacement episodes are ineligible. In
addition, episodes that originate at a Model 3 episode initiator or Model 2 physician group practice
(these providers are not hospitals), but for which surgery occurs at an included hospital are also
ineligible. Please refer to Appendix A for a complete list of MSAs in which hospitals are required to
participate and a list of providers and MSAs included in the treatment and control group. For
performance year 1 and 2, roughly 800 hospitals were eligible and participating in the CJR program. For
purposes of this analysis the treatment group consists of episodes originating at participating CJR
hospitals, that meet the inclusion criteria for the CJR program, for which complete claims data are
available for the Medicare beneficiary.
The control group contains LEJR episodes for facilities located in MSAs that were not selected by
CMS to participate in the program, but that were not specifically excluded from consideration. Episodes
that would have been excluded based on episode characteristics, or for which there was incomplete
claims data were excluded from the control group. Therefore, the control group consists of episodes
that meet the inclusion criteria for the CJR program, that originate at a hospital located in an MSA that
was not randomly selected to participate in the CJR program but was not excluded based on the criteria
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above, and in which the beneficiary receiving the lower extremity joint replacement had complete
claims data.

Variables
Dependent Variables:
The primary dependent variable for aim 1 and 2 is episode level total price standardized
Medicare payments for part A and B services. Ideally, we would measure the cost of each episode to the
provider which is likely a better proxy for provider behavior, but there are significant barriers to doing so
using administrative claims data. Administrative claims data do not include the cost associated with each
claim, as this information is generally not available when claims are submitted. Instead, researchers
generally estimate costs by reducing charges based on a hospital level ratio of costs to charges. This
ratio is available for all providers that submit Medicare cost reports (see description of the Healthcare
Cost Report Information System). It may be inadvisable to use of a hospital level ratio of cost to charges
to estimate costs for services within service lines. For example, hospitals may have widely different mark
ups for medical vs. surgical procedures. In addition, differences between hospital level cost to charge
ratios and service line specific cost to charge ratios may vary systematically due to hospital
characteristics. For example, Childers et al. found that surgical cost to charge ratios were on average
25% higher than medical cost to charge ratios, and that this difference was significantly higher at
voluntary hospitals as compared to government owned facilities.3 Therefore, costs estimated in this way
may be both inaccurate and introduce bias by hospital characteristics. Therefore, to avoid any potential
bias associated with systematic differences in the estimation of costs, this analysis instead relies on price
standardized provider payments.
In addition to total price standardized payments per episode, setting specific price standardized
payments were included for the following settings:
●

Inpatient services
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●
●
●
●
●

Outpatient services
Inpatient rehabilitation services
Skilled nursing facility services
Home health services
Hospice services

●

Professional services (Carrier Claims)

Prior evaluations of the CJR program have found that payment reductions were primarily generated
in post-acute settings, specifically through a reduction in institutional post-acute care use.14–17 The
inclusion of these variables as secondary dependent variables will test if these findings are supported by
this analysis. In addition, safety-net hospitals may have differential access to post-acute care partners,
and therefore may have less opportunity to vary treatment setting for their patients after surgery.
Price Standardization
Formulas for the calculation of price-standardized payments each type of claim are provided
below. Because Inpatient Acute Care Claims are subject to several payment adjustments that could not
be easily removed, and that have the potential to significantly, and differentially effect payments, price
standardized payments were built up from the Medicare base payment rate and the applicable DRG
weight. Payments for most other claim types were calculated by adjusting the actual Medicare and
beneficiary payments indicated on the claim for factors such as wage adjustment, disproportionate
share hospital (DSH) payments, and payments for graduate medical education. See Appendix A for a
detailed description of price standardization methods for payments in each category of services.
Independent Variables
The main independent variable of interest is the interaction between a flag indicating the
provider is included in the treatment group (i.e. participating in CJR), and a variable indicating that the
treatment has been implemented, which can be interpreted as the average treatment effect of the
program for models with price standardized payments as the dependent variable.. The time of
implementation was defined as January 1, 2016.
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Measures of Safety Net Status
Analyses were stratified by several measures of Financial Strain. First, stratification was
performed by the percent of Medicare admissions attributable to patients receiving Supplemental
Security Income (SSI Percent) and the percent of total admissions attributable to patients on Medicaid
(Medicaid Percent). These two measures collectively determine hospital eligibility for Medicare
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments.115 As these two measures are used to calculate a
Medicare payment adjustment, they are readily available at the Medicare provider number level.
Results were stratified by each of these metrics separately. The two measures were then added
together to calculate the DSH payment percentage, and results were then stratified by DSH payment
percentage.
Beneficiary/Episode Clinical Characteristics
Beneficiary demographic and clinical characteristics were included as controls in the model to
adjust for differences in patient population between the treatment and control groups. For example,
older providers are likely more likely to experience complications that may have added inpatient costs.
In addition, they may be more likely to be discharged to more complex settings, or may require more
intense rehabilitation post-surgery.
Severity of illness was accounted for by including a count of hierarchical condition categories
(HCCs) in the model. HCCs were developed by CMS for the purpose of risk adjusting Medicare Advantage
plan premiums, and have been used extensively in adjusting Medicare payments for severity of
illness.116 The HCC risk adjustment, and the associated HCC score that it produces, has been validated for
use in the general population, but CMS noes that it may not be appropriate for use for discrete clinical
episodes over a short period of time. This led CMS to finalize a proposal to adjust spending benchmarks
based on the count of HCCs along with age, which CMS determined improved the predictability of their
spending model for CJR episodes, as of October 1, 2021.39 To align with this proposal, this analysis also
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adjusts for age and HCC count as the primary method of adjusting for severity of illness. The model also
adjusts for patient age, diagnosis related group, and the presence of a lower joint fracture. The CJR sets
spending benchmarks separately by DRG, and fracture status, indicating that these variables are
important predictors of lower extremity joint replacement spending.31
The analysis also adjusts for the following anchor-hospital level characteristics that may be
important determinants of episode spending: the number of beds in service, teaching status, CMS
region, and hospital ownership. In addition, the analysis was adjusted for the population size of the
MSA, as more populous MSAs may have increased access to efficient providers. The full set of variables
included in the model is presented in table 4.
Table 4: Included Covariates

Beneficiary Demographics and Clinical
Covariates
Age
Sex
Race/Ethnicity
Heirarchical Condition Category Count
Presence of Hip-Fracture
Diagnosis Related Group

Ancho-provider level
covariates
Number of Beds in Service
Teaching Status
CMS Region
Ownership

MSA Level
Covariates
Population

Episode Construction
CJR episodes were constructed from claims data as delineated in the specifications for the CJR
program. An episode begins with an anchor admission, which is defined as any admission of a
beneficiary to a participating hospital that ultimately results in discharge under MS-DRG 469 (Major joint
replacement or reattachment of lower extremity with major complications or comorbidities) or MS-DRG
470 (Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity without major complications or
comorbidities) ending ninety days post discharge and including all Medicare related items and services
paid under Medicare part A or Part B. Unrelated services are excluded from the constructed episode.
These unrelated services are defined as both acute clinical conditions not arising from existing episode46

related chronic clinical conditions or complications of lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR) surgery,
and chronic conditions that are not generally affected by LEJR surgery.31

Analytic Methods
As a first analytic step, the study population was summarized through the calculation of
descriptive statistics. Means and standard deviations were calculated for continuous independent
variables in both the treatment and control groups. Proportions were calculated for categorical
variables in both the treatment and control groups. Graphical representations of variable distributions
and a table summarizing the characteristics of the study population were produced. Average payment
per episode per quarter was graphed over time for both the treatment and the control group. These
graphs were inspected for evidence of violations of the parallel trends assumption. All analyses were
limited to patients that were included in CMS’ five percent sample for the carrier and DME data.
Analyses were conducted using SAS Version 9.4 and Stata Version 14.2.

Statistical methods
A difference in differences (DID) approach was used to estimate whether the change in pricestandardized payments and utilization for applicable services post implementation of the CJR program in
episodes originating at participating facilities was significantly different in comparison to those
originating at non-participating facilities.
Overview of DID Estimation
The simplest set up of the DID method requires the observation of outcomes in two groups and
two time periods. Specifically, the method demands a treatment group that is exposed only in the
second time period, and a control group that is not exposed in either of the time periods.117 These
groups can be constructed from either panel data, or repeated cross-sections, though the latter requires
that the outcome is an average.118 In its simplest form, the DID method subtracts the average gain in the
control group from the average gain in the treatment group. This subtraction has two purposes. First,
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DID removes biases in second period comparisons between the treatment and control groups that could
be the result of permanent differences between those groups. Second, biases from comparisons over
time in the treatment group that could be the result of trends are removed. The result produced by the
DID model is the difference in the population average difference over time in the treatment group and
the population average difference over time in the control group.117
An important concern when using the DID method is the selection of an appropriate control
group. Depending on the control group, the policy implications of the results will be different. For
instance, when analyzing a state level health policy that applies to the elderly, we can select various
control groups, provided the available data support their selection. One option is to use only data from
the State that is implementing the policy and use the non-elderly as our control group. If our intent is to
understand the effect of the policy alone, these findings may be biased due to factors unrelated to the
implementation of the policy in question affecting the health of the elderly in relation to the nonelderly. A second option is to use the elderly population from a different state as the control. The
potential issue with this option is that changes in the health of the elderly might be systematically
different in different states. A third, more robust option, is to use both the elderly from a different state
and the non-elderly from the policy-state as a control.119
DID is attractive because it’s results are intuitive and easy to understand. In addition, it allows
for the control of lower-level covariates, the addition of more time periods, and the addition of more
groups.120 Furthermore, DID allows the researcher to remove biases in second period comparisons
between the treatment and control groups that could be the result of permanent differences between
those groups. In addition, biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that could be the
result of trends are removed. Lastly, implementation via regression provides for straightforward
inference, which can be made robust to different time or group variability.121
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Assumptions
The major assumption required for causal interpretation in the DID model is parallel trends in the
outcome for both the treatment and control group.121,122 Put simply, the DID method assumes that the
change in the outcomes prior to implementation of a given intervention is the same in the treatment
group and control group. The violation of this assumption will lead to a biased estimate of the causal
effect.121 This trend must hold across all pre-intervention time periods, but there is no requirement as to
how many pre-intervention periods are necessary.
The parallel trends assumption is generally tested through graphical inspection of the data. The
outcome is plotted for both the treated and control groups. Prior to treatment, the lines should be
parallel. An alternative method of testing is to fit a model that includes the interaction of pre-treatment
time dummy variables and the treatment dummy variable, being sure to omit one pre-treatment time
period. If parallel trends holds, these interactions should produce statistically insignificant impacts.123
Importantly, this test is only possible with multiple pre-treatment time periods. There are two other
assumptions that must be met for DID estimate to be unbiased. The first is the Stable Unit Treatment
Value Assumption (SUTVA), which implies that all treatments are completely represented and that there
are no relevant interactions between members of the population.124 Next, DID requires the assumption
that treatment did not influence the pre-treatment population.
DID Applied to Specific Aims
AIM 1: Impact of CJR on Total Medicare Payments
The DID model fit to determine the impact of the CJR program on payments is defined as
follows:
Log(Yethm )= β0 + β1Treath + δ 0Timet + δ1Timet*Treath + θi + ςht + Hosph + Yeary + MSAm + u
where,
Yethm= The log of price standardized payments for episode e at anchor hospital h located in MSA
m during year y and time t, where t=0 or 1 depending on whether the episode occurs before or
after implementation of the intervention
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Treath = an indicator of whether the facility is participating in the CJR program (Treatment v.
Control)
Timet = an indicator of pre or post initiation of the CJR program
θi = a vector of episode level covariates
ςht = a vector of anchor hospital level covariates
Hosph= a fixed effect estimate for each anchor hospital (i.e. the hospital at which the triggering
lower extremity joint replacement was performed
Yeary= a calendar year fixed effect
MSAm= a fixed effect estimate for the MSA in which the anchor hospital is located
u= a random error term
The difference in difference estimate is the coefficient δ1 and is equal to:
δ1= (ȳ Treatment, Time 2 − ȳ Treatment, Time 1) – (ȳ Control, Time 2 − ȳ Control, Time 1)
This estimate indicates whether the change in the outcome (payment, or utilization) post
implementation of the CJR program was significantly different in episodes originating at CJR
participating facilities in comparison to those originating at non-participating facilities.

Aim 1a: The Impact of CJR on Medicare Payments by Type
A two-part model was employed to evaluate the impact of the CJR model by payment type. The
first part of this model fits a logistic difference-in-differences model to estimate the difference in the
change in the log odds of having a payment of a given type after implementation of the CJR model for
episodes originating at treatment hospitals as compared to control. The part 1 model can be expressed
as follows.
log(Pr( Y)/1-Pr(Y))ethmq = β0q + β1Treath + δ 0Timet + δ1Timet*Treath + θi + ςht + Hosph + Yeary +
MSAm + u )
where,
Ypethm= For payment type p, a binary indicator equal to 1 if there are payments for the payment
type p or otherwise for episode e at anchor hospital h located in MSA m during year y and time
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t, where t=0 or 1 depending on whether the episode occurs before or after implementation of
the intervention
Treath = an indicator of whether the facility is participating in the CJR program (Treatment v.
Control)
Timet = an indicator of pre or post initiation of the CJR program
θi = a vector of episode level covariates
ςht = a vector of anchor hospital level covariates
Hosph= a fixed effect estimate for each anchor hospital (i.e. the hospital at which the triggering
lower extremity joint replacement was performed
Yeary= a calendar year fixed effect
MSAm= a fixed effect estimate for the MSA in which the anchor hospital is located
u= a random error term
The coefficient on the Time and Treat interaction remains the difference and difference
estimator, and will allow us to infer if the difference in log odds of the presence of the payment type of
interest before and after CJR is different between the treatment and control groups. This model was
repeated for Medicare payments in each category of service.
The second part of the two-part model applies the linear difference-in-differences model
described above to those episodes with a positive value for each payment type. The dependent variable
for these models is the average price standardized episode payment amount in each payment of service.
The difference-in-difference estimator for these models therefore provides an estimate of the
differential change in payments for episodes originating in treatment hospitals as opposed to control
hospitals.
AIM 2: The impact of Safety-net Status on the Change in Medicare Payments
The model discussed above was then stratified by the anchor hospital’s safety net quartile.
Below is an example of the episode level DID model stratified by financial strain:
Yethmq = β0q + β1Treath + δ 0Timet + δ1Timet*Treath + θi + ςht + Hosph + Yeary + MSAm + u
where,
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Yethmq = Price standardized payments for anchor hospital h located in MSA m during year y and
time t, where t=0 or 1 depending on whether the episode occurs before or after implementation
of the intervention, in financial strain quartile q.
Progh = An indicator of whether the facility is participating in the CJR program (Treatment v.
Control)
Timet = An indicator of pre or post initiation of the CJR program
θi = A vector of beneficiary level covariates
ςh = A vector of hospital level covariates
Hosph= a fixed effect estimate for each anchor hospital (i.e. the hospital at which the triggering
lower extremity joint replacement was performed
Yeary= a calendar year fixed effect
MSAm= a fixed effect estimate for the MSA in which the anchor hospital is located
u= a random error term
The difference in difference estimate is the variable δ1 and is equal to:
δ1= (ȳ Treatment, Time 2 − ȳ Treatment, Time 1) – (ȳ Control, Time 2 − ȳ Control, Time 1)
This estimate indicates whether the change in the outcome (payment, or utilization) post
implementation of the CJR program was significantly different in episodes originating at CJR
participating facilities in comparison to those originating at non-participating facilities within each
financial strain quartile. In addition, a model was fit with a triple interaction term, interacting the
difference in difference estimator described above with the categorical variable indicating the quartile
of safety-net burden. Type III main effects were requested for the triple interaction, which served as an
indicator of whether or not differences between strata were significantly different.
To implement the models associated with aim 1, and aim 2, generalized linear regressions with
MSA and hospital level fixed effects and cluster robust standard errors were fit. The SAS GENOMD
procedure was employed to conduct the analysis. The GENMOD procedure fits generalized linear
models, including traditional linear models, logistic regressions, Poisson regression models and gamma
models. The GENMOD procedure provides the ability to fit Generalized Estimating Equation models,
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which are appropriate when clustered data.125 These specified a normal distribution, and employed the
default link function, which is the identity function. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the
hospital level, based on an autoregressive covariance structure. The twopm command in Stata was
employed to fit the two-part logistic/OLS models for of our analysis of payments by categories of service
(Aim 1a). Part one of these models specified a binomial distribution, employed the logit link function and
standard errors robust to clustering at the hospital level were requested. Part 2 of the two-part model
specified a normal distribution, and standard errors robust to clustering at the hospital level were
requested. Due to smaller sample sizes in the category of service specific models, two-part models did
not include MSA and provider fixed effects. In addition, as the two-part model incorporates many zero
payments, payments were not log transformed. Note, for inpatient payments and anchor hospitalization
payments, a two-part model was not necessary as all observations include these payments. Instead, the
regress command in STATA was used to fit an OLS equivalent to part two of the two-part model.
A fixed effects model was chosen over a random effects model to avoid introducing bias due to
the potential violation of a key assumption of random effects models, that random effects (i.e. the error
term and any other effects modeled as random) are uncorrelated with the regressors of our model (i.e.
those not modeled as random). Therefore, if either the hospital effect or the MSA effect are correlated
with both the change in payments per episode, and any of our other covariates, our model would fail to
meet a key assumption of the random effects model, the model would suffer from endogeneity, and our
estimates would be biased and inconsistent.126 A fixed effects model does not carry this additional
assumption, because fixed effects models only use variation within each hospital and MSA over time,
but not between them. The trade off when using a fixed effect model is that estimates will be less
precise, but the size of our dataset should mitigate the lack of precision. Hospital and MSA level fixed
effects were included in the model to ensure that our analysis is measuring the impact of the policy on
providers ability to reduce payments rather than differences in unmeasured MSA or hospital level
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characteristics that may influence a providers ability to reduce payments. For example, MSAs with more
Medicaid patients, or more Medicare patients receiving supplemental security income may also be more
likely to have a lower concentration of healthcare providers, because such markets may be less
profitable. Furthermore, to the extent that payment reductions may be reliant on shifting care from less
efficient to more efficient providers, markets that are less concentrated may be less likely to reduce
payments because it may be less likely that a more efficient provider is available. Therefore, when
analyzing the differential impact of the CJR program on providers that serve varying levels of Medicaid
and SSI patients, without controlling for differences in the market, which is here defined as the MSA,
observed differences may appear to be due to differences in Medicaid percent, or SSI percent, but in
actuality be confounded by differences in market concentration.

Sensitivity Analyses
Several sensitivity analyses were conducted to ensure that the choices made in designing the
analysis did not adversely impact the validity of the results.
The time of implementation was varied. While the CJR program officially began April 1, 2016,
the program was originally finalized in a final rule published in November 2015. This rule included the
details of the program, as well as the final set of MSAs selected for participation.31 Hospitals may have
therefore begun to augment their care processes once they were selected for participation, rather than
upon the program officially going into effect. Conversely, it is possible that the ability to make the
necessary changes to reduce costs per episode may be developed over time. Therefore, the impact of
the program as represented in the data may be lagged. To account for each of these situations, we
varied the timing of the implementation flag, and ran the model specified above with the time of
implementation flagged in the third quarter of 2015, and third quarter of 2016 respectively.
In December of 2017, CMS officially finalized a policy to limit the number of MSAs that were
required to participate in the CJR model. Of the original 67 MSAs selected for approval, 33 were
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converted to voluntary. Hospitals located within the MSAs were given a one time opportunity to opt-in
to participation in CJR, beginning February 1, 2018.127 The primary analysis employs an intent-to-treat
approach for two reasons. First, this maximizes the amount of data that can be used in the analysis.
Second, it ensures that the initial impact of the model on these providers is captured and does not
pollute the control group. Two alternatives were also modeled, the analysis was also run excluding
episodes that began after January 1, 2018. Second, the model was fit excluding facilities that ultimately
opted out of the program from both the treatment and control group.
To calculate cluster robust standard errors, the primary model assumes an autoregressive
covariance structure. This covariance structure assumes that the covariance between observations
within the same unit, in this case anchor hospital, is nonzero, but that the covariance decreases towards
zero with increasing lag between observations.128 This structure was chosen as, across the study time
period, within hospital similarities likely decrease over time. If the chosen covariance structure does not
accurately represent the true nature of the covariance between observations, standard errors may be
inaccurate, and inference may be inefficient.128 As a sensitivity analysis, the model was also fit assuming
an exchangeable, or compound symmetry, covariance structure. This structure assumes homogenous
covariance within groups, but not across groups, and without the assumption that the covariance
between observations decreases over time.128
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Chapter 4: Results
Description of Sample
Between 2011 and the end of the third quarter of 2018, there were 2,138,566 LEJR episodes
meeting the inclusion criteria for the analysis, before accounting for the patients inclusion in the 5%
sample for professional claims. After limiting the dataset to only episodes for patients included in the 5%
sample, our dataset included 108,862 LEJR episodes, performed across 1,586 hospitals. Table 5 provides
a count of episodes by calendar year along with average price standardized payment per episode. In
general, the volume of LEJR episodes meeting the inclusion criteria increased steadily from 2011-2017.
The volume of included episodes that begun in 2018 was lower than all previous years, but this was
likely due to the exclusion of episodes beginning in the fourth quarter of 2018, as these episodes would
have extended into 2019, and therefore would be incomplete in our dataset.
Table 5: Number of Episodes and Average Episode Payment by Year

Calendar Year of Anchor Hospitalization
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total

Number of Episodes
12,677
13,151
13,628
13,731
14,583
15,374
15,488
10,230
108,862

Average price
standardized
payment per
episode
27,390
26,447
26,299
25,934
25,650
24,462
23,719
23,794
25,448

Treatment vs. Control
The treatment group included 46,789 episodes originating at 730 hospitals while the control
group included 62,073 episodes originating at 856 hospitals. Table 6 displays the average covariate
levels for hospital level continuous variables in the treatment and control group, and an indication of
whether differences are statistically significant. The average percent of Medicare admissions for
patients receiving SSI were significantly higher at hospitals in the treatment group compared to the
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control group. Both average Medicaid percent and certified beds were higher in the treatment group
compared to the control group, but these differences were not statistically significant.
Table 6: Average Value of Hospital Level Covariates
Treatment
Mean

Variable

Control
Mean

Coeff.

P

Percent of Medicare Admissions Rec. SSI

0.1051

0.0742

0.0099

0.0044*

Medicaid as a Percent of Total Admissions

0.2318

0.2203

-0.0066

0.4258

306.2441

280.6842

4.2026

0.8950

Certified Beds
Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

Table 7 displays the distribution of hospitals in the treatment and control groups by the level of
each categorical variable examined. The treatment and control groups varied significantly by the CMS
region in which the hospital was located but did not vary significantly based on teaching status or
ownership type.
Table 7: Differences between Hospitals in the Treatment and Control Group
Hospital Count
All Episodes
Hospital
Characteristics

730

Hospital Count

Percent

Hospital Count

0.46

Percent

856

Hospital Count

Percent
0.54

Percent

ChiSquare

Prob.

211.8016

<.0001*

2.9864

0.39

Region
Region 1

7

0.01

46

0.05

Region 2

107

0.15

52

0.06

Region 3

33

0.05

54

0.06

Region 4

156

0.21

185

0.22

Region 5

90

0.12

128

0.15

Region 6

82

0.11

132

0.15

Region 7

59

0.08

39

0.05

Region 8

34

0.05

27

0.03

Region 9

125

0.17

169

0.20

37

0.05

24

0.03

Major Teaching

154

0.18

177

0.18

Limited

165

0.20

178

0.18

Region 10
Teaching Status
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Graduate
Non-teaching
Hospital
Characteristics

47

0.06

45

0.05

470

0.56

576

0.59

Hospital Count

Percent

Hospital Count

Percent

ChiSquare

Prob.

2.36

0.50

Ownership
For Profit

185

0.23

248

0.26

Non-profit

409

0.51

458

0.48

Government

110

0.14

127

0.13

105

0.13

122

0.13

Other
Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

Table 8 displays the distribution of episodes based on patient characteristics. Patient
characteristics for episodes in the treatment group varied significantly from those in the control group.
Treatment episodes were slightly, but significantly, more likely to be for female patients. In addition,
treatment episodes were less likely to be White, or North American Native, but more likely to be Black,
Asian, Hispanic, or of unknown or other race. Treatment episodes were also more likely to have an
anchor admission for DRG 469 as opposed to 470, and to be for a patient experiencing a hip fracture.
Table 8: Distribution of Episodes by Patient Characteristics
Patient/Episode
Characteristics

Episode Count

Percent

Episode Count

Percent

ChiSquare

P

5.9257

0.0149*

219.47

<.0001*

Sex
M

16,349

34.94

22,132

35.66

F

30,438

65.06

39,939

64.34

1.10

598

0.96

89.10

56,315

90.73

Race
Unknown
White

513
41,689

Black

2,749

5.88

3,410

5.49

Other

503

1.08

556

0.90

Asian

530

1.13

375

0.60

Hispanic

660

1.41

520

0.84

58

Patient/Episode
Characteristics

Episode Count

Percent

Episode Count

Percent

143

0.31

299

0.48

469

2,491

5.32

3,134

5.05

470

44,296

94.68

58,937

94.95

6,589

14.08

8,110

13.07

40,198

85.92

53,961

86.93

North American Native

ChiSquare

P

4.1193

0.0424*

23.6381

<.0001*

Anchor DRG

Fracture Status
Fracture
No Fracture
Note: Significant at the α=.05 level

Average Spending by Covariate
The average price standardized payment per episode across the study period was $25,448 (s. d.
$15,385) but varied widely. Estimated price standardized episode payments for the least expensive
episode was $4,740 while episode payments for the most expensive episode was $813,888. Average
payments per episode were higher for episodes originating at a hospital included in the treatment group
( $26,267) as compared to the control group ($24,832). Average price standardized payment per episode
decreased monotonically each year across the study period with the exception of 2018. The slight
increase in average payments in 2018 could be due to a change in Medicare payment policy allowing
total knee replacements to be performed in the outpatient setting. This change could have resulted in
lower cost, less complex surgeries being performed in the outpatient setting. These surgeries were not
included as anchor admissions, as they are not admissions and were not originally accounted for by the
CJR program and are therefore excluded from our analysis. Table 9 displays average price standardized
episode payments by size category. Average price standardized payment per episode appeared to
increase as the number of staffed beds increased. Episodes performed by anchor hospitals in the lowest
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size category had average price standardized payment per episode of $21,461 as compared to 26,343 in
the highest size category.

Table 9: Average Episode Payment by Hospital Size
Anchor Hospital Size
Category

Average Price Standardized
Payment Per Episode ($)

0-50

21,462

51-100

23,162

101-200

25,506

200-500

25,933

500+

26,344

Average price-standardized payments per episode also varied by region. The region with the
lowest average price standardized payment was CMS region 10, which includes Alaska, Idaho, Oregon
and Washington. The region with the highest average price standardized payment per episode was CMS
region 2, which includes New York and New Jersey. This region also includes Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands, but these geographies were not eligible for the CJR program and are excluded from our analysis.
Table 10 provides average price standardized episode payments stratified by CMS region.
Table 10: Average Episode Payment by Region

CMS Region Code (States Served)

Average Price
Standardized
Payment per
Episode
($)

1 (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont)

26,331

2 (New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands)

28,527

3 (Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia)

25,129
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4 (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee)

26,287

5 (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin)

23,734

6 (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)

26,991

7 (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska)

23,986

8 (Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming)

23,280

9 (Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Pacific Territories)

25,269

10 (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington)

22,445

Table 11 provides average price standardized episode payments stratified by the Medicaid
percent and SSI percent quartile for the anchor hospital. Average episode payments increased
monotonically across quartiles of SSI Percent. Average payments did not increase monotonically across
quartiles of Medicaid percent or DSH percent, as average payments for anchor hospitals falling in the
second quartile were greater than for anchor hospitals falling in the third quartile.
Table 11: Average Episode Payment by Medicaid Percent of Total Discharges

Average Price
Standardized Payment
per Episode
($)

St. Dev.

Medicaid Percent
Lowest Quartile

24,941.19

14,019.83

Second Quartile

26,160.88

15,433.24

Third Quartile

25,270.18

15,284.58

Highest Quartile

26,522.10

17,377.40

Lowest Quartile

24,097.94

13,335.16

Second Quartile

24,876.84

14,190.47

Third Quartile

25,598.36

16,362.34

Highest Quartile

27,969.87

17,742.40

DSH Percent
Lowest Quartile

23,808.91

12,921.27

Second Quartile

25,788.72

14,963.54

Third Quartile
Highest Quartile

25,401.96
26,938.99

15,486.76
17,801.47

SSI Percent
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Average payments were similar for episodes originating at anchor hospitals in the for-profit,
non-profit, and other ownership categories. Episodes originating at government-controlled facilities had
higher average price standardized episode payments. Episodes originating at major teaching hospitals
appeared to have average price episode payments higher than episodes originating at other facilities.
Table 12 provides the average price standardized episode payments and standard deviations by
ownership category and teaching status.
Table 12: Average Episode Payments by Ownership and Teaching Status

Characteristic

Average Price
Standardized
Payment per Episode
($)

St. Dev

Anchor Hospital Ownership Category
For Profit

25,219.72

15,200.21

Non-profit
Government

25,312.01
26,822.66

15,279.47
16,735.84

Other

25,108.88

14,666.81

Anchor Hospital Teaching Status
Major Teaching

26,123.54

15,807.03

Limited

25,126.77

15,033.48

Graduate

25,336.11

18,992.77

Non-teaching

25,281.61

14,967.01

Average price-standardized payments per episode varied by race. Payments were lowest among
episodes in which the race was reported as unknown, followed by other. Payments were higher for
episodes in which the patients race was coded as North American Native, Black, Asian, or Hispanic as
compared to those that were coded as White. Table 13 displays average price-standardized episode
payments stratified by race ethnicity category.
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Table 13: Average Episode Payments by Race/Ethnicity

Average Price Standardized Payment per
Episode ($)

Race/Ethnicity
Unknown

20,531

White

25,316

Black

27,276

Other

24,608

Asian

29,300

Hispanic

29,115

North American Native

26,077

Average payments for episodes in DRG 469 (with MCC) were nearly double average payments
for DRG 470 (Without MCC). Furthermore, average episode payments for episodes in which the initial
admission included a hip-fracture were roughly double average episode payments for episodes in which
the initial hospitalization did not include a hip fracture. Table 14 provides the average price standardized
episode payment and standard deviation by DRG and fracture status.
Table 14: Average Episode Payment by DRG and Hip-fracture Status
Average Price Standardized
Payment per Episode
($)

St. Dev.

No-Fracture

22,511.96

11,737.90

Fracture

44,262.66

21,474.87

47,844.86
24,228.32

27,242.12
13,428.79

Hip-fracture Status

DRG
DRG 469
DRG 470

Bivariate Analyses
Table 15 displays the results of a log-linear model regressing each covariate on total price
standardized episode payments without adjusting for other factors. Standard errors are robust to
clustering at the hospital level.
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Without controlling for the effects of other variables, hospital characteristics were found to
significantly impact average episode spending. Smaller anchor hospitals were on average associated
with lower total price standardized spending per episode. Most episodes originated in hospitals with
between 200 and 500 beds, and therefore this size category was chosen as the reference category. Total
price standardized episode payments were 13% lower for episodes originating at anchor hospitals with
less than 50 beds (P<.001), and 9% lower for hospitals originating at hospitals with between 51 and 100
beds in service (P<.001) as compared to the referent. Episodes originating in hospitals with between 101
and 200 beds in service, or greater than 500 beds in service was not found to be statistically significantly
higher than for episodes originating at hospitals with between 200 and 500 beds in service. Only
government ownership was associated with a significant difference in price standardized episode
payment. Price standardized total episode payments for episodes originating at government owned
hospitals were on average 5% higher than episodes originating at non-profit anchor hospitals (P=.0008).
The impact of the anchor hospitals teaching status on total price standardized episode payments was
dependent on the type of teaching facility. Price standardized total episode payments for episodes that
originated at a major-teaching hospitals, as defined by the Medicare provider of services file, were 3%
higher compared to non-teaching facilities (P=.0206). Price standardized total episode payments for
episodes that originated at hospitals with only a limited or graduate affiliation with a medical school
were not found to be significantly different than at non-teaching facilities.
The safety-net status of the anchor hospital, when measured as the percent of total admissions
attributable to Medicaid patients or the DSH patient percentage, had a significant effect on price
standardized episode payments. A one percentage point increase in the percent of total discharges that
were attributable to Medicaid patients at the anchor hospital was associated with a 19% increase
(P<.0001) in price standardized total episode payments. A one percentage point increase in the DSH
patient percentage was associated with a 16% increase (P=.0018) in price standardized total episode
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payments. The SSI percent of Medicare admissions was not found to be significantly associated with
average price standardized episode payments.
The population of the metropolitan statistical area that the anchor hospital was located in was
also found to be significantly associated with average price standardized payments. The results
presented for this variable are from a log-log model to account for the differences in magnitude
between the independent and dependent variable. A one percent increase in MSA population was
associated with a 2.2 percent increase in average price standardized per episode payments (P<.0001).
Patient characteristics were also examined. Price standardized episode payments were 7% lower
for males as compared to females (P<.001). Beneficiary age was associated with decreased price
standardized payments, but this relationship was found to be nonlinear. Inclusion of a quadratic term,
age squared, in the analysis indicates that on average payments decrease as age increases, but this
effect decreases as age advances. Price standardized episode payments for Black, Asian and Hispanic
beneficiaries, were significantly higher than for white beneficiaries. Episodes for black, Asian and
Hispanic beneficiaries were on average 7% (P<.0001) , 12% (P<.0001) and 10% (P<.0001) more expensive
than for white beneficiaries. Episodes for beneficiaries whose race is listed as unknown were associated
with average payments 10% lower (P<.0001) than for white beneficiaries, while beneficiaries whose race
was listed as other were not found to have significantly different price standardized payments as
compared to whites. As expected, indicators of increased clinical complexity were associated with
higher episode payments. Price standardized episode payments for patients for which a hip fracture
was indicated on the anchor hospital claim were 87% higher (P<.0001) than for those without a hip
fracture during the anchor hospitalization. Price standardized episode payments for episodes in which
the anchor hospitalization was assigned to DRG 469 were 82% higher (P<.0001) than episodes in which
the anchor hospitalization was assigned to DRG 470. This is intuitive as DRG 469 includes lower
extremity joint replacements with major complication or comorbidity (MCC), while DRG 470 includes
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lower extremity joint replacements without MCC. In addition, the count of HCCs was significantly
associated with increased price standardized payments. A one HCC increase in the count was found to
increase average payments by .8 percent (P<.0001).
Table 15: Bivariate Results of Log-linear Models for Each Intended Covariate
Covariate

Estimate

Exp
(Est.)

S.E.

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

S.E.

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

Hospital Characteristics
Anchor Hospital Safety Net Status
Estimate
Intercept
Medicaid Percent
of Total Discharges

10.008

-

0.173

1.188

Estimate
Intercept

10.028

SSI Percent of
Medicare Discharges

9.997

9.988

10.027

1003.480

<.0001*

0.044

0.087

0.258

3.960

<.0001*

S.E.
-

0.138

Intercept
Medicare
Disproportionate
Share Percentage

0.010

1.148

-

0.151

1.164

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

0.007

10.014

10.042

1430.300

<.0001*

0.077

-0.013

0.289

1.790

0.073

0.014

9.971

10.024

742.690

<.0001*

0.049

0.056

0.247

3.120

0.0018*

Anchor Hospital Size
Estimate
Intercept

10.049

0-50 Beds

-0.145

51-100 Beds

-0.091

101-200 Beds

S.E.
-

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

0.007

10.036

10.063

1478.650

<.0001*

0.865

0.013

-0.171

-0.119

-10.840

<.0001*

0.913

0.015

-0.120

-0.062

-6.230

<.0001*

-0.011

0.989

0.011

-0.032

0.009

-1.080

0.281

500+ Beds

0.012

1.012

0.012

-0.011

0.035

1.040

0.298

200-500 Beds

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

.

.

Anchor Hospital Ownership
Estimate

S.E.

UCL

Z

Prob Z

Intercept

10.029

0.006

10.017

10.041

1658.220

For-profit

-0.003

0.998

0.012

-0.026

0.022

-0.200

0.049

1.050

0.014

0.020

0.077

3.360

-0.005

0.995

0.012

-0.029

0.018

-0.440

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Government
Other
Non-profit

-

LCL
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.

<.0001*
0.841
0.0008*
0.663
.

Covariate

Estimate

Exp
(Est.)

S.E.

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

S.E.

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

Anchor Hospital Medical School Affiliation
Estimate
Intercept

10.029

-

0.006

10.017

10.041

1591.050

<.0001*

Major

0.027

1.027

0.011

0.004

0.049

2.320

0.0206*

Limited

-0.007

0.993

0.011

-0.028

0.014

-0.650

0.519

Graduate

-0.008

0.992

0.020

-0.048

0.031

-0.420

0.678

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

No Affiliation

.

.

Anchor Hospital CMS Region
Estimate
Intercept

9.916

1

0.172

2

S.E.
-

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

0.013

9.891

9.942

776.500

<.0001*

1.188

0.022

0.129

0.215

7.820

<.0001*

0.243

1.275

0.026

0.191

0.294

9.280

<.0001*

3

0.115

1.122

0.018

0.080

0.151

6.320

<.0001*

4

0.150

1.162

0.015

0.121

0.180

9.970

<.0001*

5

0.048

1.049

0.017

0.015

0.081

2.830

0.0046*

6

0.158

1.171

0.021

0.116

0.199

7.430

<.0001*

7

0.059

1.061

0.020

0.020

0.098

2.970

0.0029*

8

0.033

1.033

0.023

-0.012

0.077

1.450

0.148

9

0.113

1.120

0.018

0.079

0.148

6.420

<.0001*

10

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

.

.

Z

Prob Z

Beneficiary/Episode Characteristics
Beneficiary Age

Estimate

Intercept

12.1231

Age

-0.0762
0.0006

Age-Squared

S.E.
-

10.029

UCL

0.0711

11.9837

12.2624

170.52

<.0001*

0.9266

0.002

-0.0801

-0.0723

-38.26

<.0001*

1.001

0

0.0006

0.0007

46.96

<.0001*

Beneficiary Race/Ethnicity
Estimate
Intercept

LCL

S.E.
-

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

0.005

10.020

10.039

2062.680

<.0001*

Black

0.064

1.066

0.007

0.050

0.077

9.170

<.0001*

Asian

0.110

1.118

0.016

0.078

0.141

6.770

<.0001*

0.090

1.095

0.016

0.060

0.121

5.760

<.0001*

Hispanic
North American
Native
Other

0.023

1.021

0.024

-0.025

0.070

0.940

0.345

-0.011

0.988

0.013

-0.036

0.015

-0.810

0.418

Unknown Race

-0.103

0.903

0.010

-0.123

-0.083

-10.260

<.0001*

67

Covariate

Estimate

White

0.000

Exp
(Est.)
0.000

S.E.

LCL

0.000

UCL
0.000

0.000

Z

Prob Z

.

.

Beneficiary Count of Heirarchical Condition Category (HCC)
Estimate
Intercept

9.978

HCC Count

0.008

S.E.
1.009

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

0.005

9.969

9.988

2051.760

<.0001*

0.000

0.008

0.009

37.640

<.0001*

Beneficiary Sex
Estimate
Intercept

10.058

Male

-0.068
0.000

Female

S.E.
-

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

0.005

10.048

10.067

2071.550

<.0001*

0.934

0.003

-0.074

-0.062

-22.840

<.0001*

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

.

.

Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) of Episode Anchor Admission
Estimate
Intercept
DRG 469
DRG 470

S.E.

10.003
0.596
0.000

-

9.950

-

1.816
0.000

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

0.005
0.007
0.000

9.994
0.582
0.000

10.012
0.610
0.000

2180.370
83.330

0.004

9.942

9.958

2430.040

<.0001*

0.005

0.602

0.622

125.840

<.0001*

.

<.0001*
<.0001*
.

Presence of a Hip Fracture
Intercept
Hip Fracture
Present

0.612

1.844

Metropolitan Statistial Area Characteristics
Population
Estimate
Intercept
Log MSA
Population

S.E.

LCL

UCL

Z

Prob Z

9.716

-

0.060

9.600

9.833

163.020

<.0001*

0.023

-

0.004

0.014

0.031

5.280

<.0001*

Notes:
*Statistically Significant at the α=.05 level
¥ CMS Region Codes: 1 (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont);2 (New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands);3 (Delaware, District of Columbia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia);4 (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee);5 (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, Wisconsin);6 (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas);7 (Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska);8 (Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming);9
(Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Pacific Territories);10 (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington)
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Exp
S.E.
LCL
UCL
Z
Prob Z
(Est.)
†DRG 469: Major Hip/Knee Joint Replacement Or Reattachment Of Lower Extremity With MCC Or Total
Ankle Replacement; DRG 470: Major Hip/Knee Joint Replacement Or Reattachment Of Lower Extremity
With/out MCC Or Total Ankle Replacement
Covariate

Estimate

Investigating Parallel Trends
Figure 2 displays the trend in average price standardized per episode payments across the study
period for both the treatment and control group. Prior to the intervention the trajectory of payments
was observed to be similar in the treatment and control group, with payments in both groups
decreasing over time but payments consistently higher in the treatment group. Post-intervention
average payments in the treatment group appear to decrease more than in the control group. To further
investigate if concerns are warranted regarding the parallel trends assumption, we also fit a model that
regressed price standardized payments per episode for the time period leading up to intervention on a
dummy variable of each time period, an indicator of treatment, and the interaction between those two
variables. Table 16 presents the results of this analysis. The model returned insignificant effects for all
but one interaction terms, indicating that parallel trends is a reasonable assumption outside of this timeperiod. The significant effect of the interaction between treatment and the indicator for the third
quarter of 2015 indicates that the slope of the price standardized payment per episode curve was
significantly different for the treatment group as compared to the control group. This may indicate a
violation of the parallel trends assumption, and may introduce bias.
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Figure 2: Trend in Average Price Standardized per Episode Payments: Treatment vs. Control
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Table 16: Regression results of Parallel Trends Investigation

Parameter
Intercept
treatment
Q1 2011
Q2 2011
Q3 2011
Q4 2011
Q1 2012
Q2 2012
Q3 2012
Q4 2012
Q1 2013
Q2 2013
Q3 2013
Q4 2013
Q1 2014
Q2 2014
Q3 2014
Q4 2014
Q1 2015
Q2 2015
Q3 2015
Q4 2015
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *
Treatment *

Q1 2011
Q2 2011
Q3 2011
Q4 2011
Q1 2012
Q2 2012
Q3 2012
Q4 2012
Q1 2013
Q2 2013
Q3 2013
Q4 2013
Q1 2014

Estimate
26,369
(1,707.52)
1,412.67
1,975.75
1,827.84
1,447.08
39.68
575.18
555.99
1,306.41
1,562.60
1,171.95
725.23
865.53
779.37
415.38
895.01
1,225.77
576.49
1,950.73
468.27
762.92
(422.31)
(100.39)
(518.45)
1,219.04
270.62
418.89
390.89
(1,287.98)
210.99
503.63
(290.08)
(391.17)

Upper
Lower Bound
Bound
Z
25,523.96
27,214.54
(2,791.33)
(623.71)
319.29
2,506.05
923.02
3,028.48
702.31
2,953.37
345.87
2,548.30
(972.46)
1,051.81
(479.58)
1,629.94
(527.29)
1,639.27
269.69
2,343.12
522.07
2,603.14
79.85
2,264.05
(335.64)
1,786.10
(136.97)
1,868.03
(239.71)
1,798.45
(639.23)
1,469.99
(117.72)
1,907.73
115.53
2,336.02
(472.32)
1,625.31
851.21
3,050.25
(528.69)
1,465.23
.
(723.05)
2,248.89
(1,867.87)
1,023.25
(1,599.52)
1,398.74
(1,919.90)
883.00
(183.56)
2,621.63
(1,112.60)
1,653.84
(987.69)
1,825.47
(999.04)
1,780.83
(2,640.28)
64.31
(1,246.83)
1,668.81
(897.62)
1,904.88
(1,629.46)
1,049.31
(1,702.84)
920.49
71

Prob >
|Z|
61.14
(3.09)
2.53
3.68
3.18
2.58
0.08
1.07
1.01
2.47
2.94
2.10
1.34
1.69
1.50
0.77
1.73
2.16
1.08
3.48
0.92
1.01
(0.57)
(0.13)
(0.73)
1.70
0.38
0.58
0.55
(1.87)
0.28
0.70
(0.42)
(0.58)

0
<.01*
0.01*
<.01*
<.01*
0.01*
0.94
0.29
0.31
0.01*
<.01*
0.04*
0.18
0.09
0.13
0.44
0.08
0.03*
0.28
<.01*
0.36
.
0.31
0.57
0.9
0.47
0.09
0.7
0.56
0.58
0.06
0.78
0.48
0.67
0.56

Treatment * Q2 2014
339.13
Treatment * Q3 2014
(265.82)
Treatment * Q4 2014
(580.43)
Treatment * Q1 2015
(9.11)
Treatment * Q2 2015
(1,490.35)
Treatment * Q3 2015
147.24
Treatment * Q4 2015
Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

(1,039.00)
(1,589.02)
(2,014.37)
(1,376.62)
(2,874.78)
(1,169.28)
-

1,717.26
1,057.37
853.52
1,358.40
(105.92)
1,463.76
-

0.48
(0.39)
(0.79)
(0.01)
(2.11)
0.22
.

0.63
0.69
0.43
0.99
0.03*
0.83
.

Multivariate Analyses
Impact of CJR on Price Standardized Total Episode Payments
The primary independent variable is the difference in difference estimator. The difference in
differences estimator indicates that there was a significant impact of the CJR program on total price
standardized episode payments after controlling for covariates, including beneficiary demographics,
clinical characteristics, hospital characteristics, MSA population and hospital and MSA level fixed effects.
Price standardized episode payments for episodes that originated at CJR Participating anchor hospitals
decreased by 3.5% more (P<.0001) than price standardized episode payments for episodes originating at
an anchor hospital assigned to the control group. The full results of the model are provided in Table 17.
After controlling for covariates, including hospital and MSA fixed effects, the percent of total
discharges for Medicaid patients was no longer found to have a significant impact on average price
standardized Medicare payments per episode. Interestingly, a one percentage point increase in the
percent of Medicare patients receiving Supplemental Security Income was associated with a two
percent increase in average episode payments (p<.0001). Bivariate analysis indicated the opposite
relationship, with the Medicaid percent being significantly associated with average episode payments,
while the SSI percent of Medicare was not significantly associated with average episode payments,
indicating that the relationship between these two measures of safety-net status and episode payments
was confounded by the effect of other variables. Price standardized total episode payments for episodes
originating at government owned hospitals were on average 3% higher than episodes originating at non72

profit anchor hospitals, but this effect was only marginally significant (p=.0516). Major teaching status
was also no longer associated with a significant difference in average price standardized episode
payments. After controlling for the effects of other variables, the size category of the anchor hospital
was no longer a significant determinant of average episode payments.
Patient demographics and clinical characteristics remained important drivers of episode
spending. Price standardized episode payments were 5% lower for males as compared to females
(P<.001). The multivariate model indicates a non-linear relationship between beneficiary age and
average price standardized payments, with increased age being associated with decreased price
standardized payments on average, but with this effect decreasing as age advances (p<.0001, p<.0001).
Price standardized episode payments for Black, Asian, Hispanic and North American Native beneficiaries
were on average 9% (p<.0001), 4% (p=.0053), 4% (p=.0016) and 6% (p=.0053) more expensive than for
white beneficiaries. The other and unknown race categories were not associated with significant
differences in episode payments.
Indicators of increased clinical complexity remained associated with higher episode payments
after controlling for covariates. Price standardized episode payments for patients for which a hip
fracture was indicated on the anchor hospital claim were 44% higher than for those without a hip
fracture during the anchor hospitalization (p<.0001). Price standardized episode payments for episodes
in which the anchor hospitalization was assigned to DRG 469 were 38% higher than episodes in which
the anchor hospitalization was assigned to DRG 470 (p<.0001). In addition, the count of HCCs was
significantly associated with increased price standardized payments. A one HCC increase in the count
was found to increase average payments by 2 percent (p<.0001).
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Table 17: Multivariate Results of DID Analysis Estimating Impact of CJR on Total Average Episode Payments

Covariate

Estimate

Intercept

10.837

Difference in Differences
Treatment
0.471
Control
0.000
Post-Implementation
0.020
Pre-Implementation
0.000
DID Estimator Treatment *
-0.035
Post-Implementation
Year
2012
-0.017
2013
-0.014
2014
-0.028
2015
-0.141
2016
-0.368
2017
-0.389
2018
-0.413
2011
0.000
Hospital Characteristics
Anchor Hospital Safety Net Status
Medicaid Percent of Total
-0.092
Discharges
SSI Percent of Medicare
0.023
Discharges
Anchor Hospital Size
0-50 Beds
0.061
51-100 Beds
0.030
101-200 Beds
0.005
500+ Beds
0.012
200-500 Beds
Anchor Hospital Ownership
For-profit
0.007
Government
0.030
Other
0.002
Non-profit
0.000
Anchor Hospital Medical School Affiliation
Major
-0.017
Limited
-0.001
Graduate
0.020
No Affiliation
0.000
Anchor Hospital CMS Region
1 (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT)
0.358
2 (NJ, NY, PR, VI)
0.465
3 (DE, DC, MD, PA, VA, WV)
0.257

exp
(Estimate)

LowerCL

UpperCL

0.986

8.904

12.770

0.023
0.000
0.006
0.000

0.426
0.000
0.007
0.000

0.516
0.000
0.033
0.000

0.965

0.006

-0.047

-0.024

-5.985

<.0001*

0.983
0.986
0.972
0.869
0.692
0.678
0.662

0.005
0.005
0.005
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.010
0.000

-0.026
-0.024
-0.039
-0.153
-0.384
-0.407
-0.433
0.000

-0.008
-0.004
-0.018
-0.129
-0.351
-0.370
-0.392
0.000

-3.725
-2.839
-5.163
-23.800
-43.796
-40.509
-39.672

<.0001*
0.005*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
.

0.912

0.061

-0.211

0.026

-1.530

0.127

1.023

0.001

0.020

0.025

17.860

<.0001*

1.063
1.030
1.005
1.012

0.042
0.019
0.009
0.012

-0.020
-0.007
-0.012
-0.011

0.143
0.067
0.022
0.035

1.474
1.564
0.559
1.032

0.140
0.118
0.576
0.302

1.007
1.030
1.002

0.014
0.015
0.011
0.000

-0.020
0.000
-0.019
0.000

0.034
0.060
0.024
0.000

0.480
1.950
0.210

0.628
0.052
0.833
.

0.012
0.010
0.023
0.000

-0.041
-0.020
-0.024
0.000

0.007
0.019
0.064
0.000

-1.400
-0.070
0.900

0.160
0.941
0.369
.

0.183
0.135
0.134

-0.001
0.201
-0.005

0.718
0.729
0.518

1.960
3.450
1.920

0.051
0.001*
0.054

1.602
1.020
.

0.983
0.999
1.020

1.431
1.592
1.293
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Stderr

Z

ProbZ
10.990

<.0001*

20.520

<.0001*
.
0.002*
.

.
3.077
.

.

.

.

4 (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC,
0.500
1.649
SC, TN)
5 (IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI)
0.417
1.518
6 (AK, LA, NM, OK, TX)
1.313
3.717
7 (IA, KS, MO, NE)
0.524
1.688
8 (CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY)
0.282
1.326
9 (AZ, CA, HI, NV, PT)
0.136
1.145
10 (AK, ID, OR, WA)
0.000
Beneficiary/Episode Characteristics
Beneficiary Age
Age
-0.024
0.976
Age-Squared
0.000
1.000
Beneficiary Race/Ethnicity
Black
0.006
1.006
Asian
0.087
1.091
Hispanic
0.010
1.010
North American Native
0.035
1.035
Other
0.038
1.039
Unknown Race
0.056
1.057
White
0.000
Beneficiary Count of Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC)
HCC Count
0.019
1.019
Beneficiary Sex
Male
-0.051
0.950
Female
0.000
1.000
Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) of Episode Anchor Admission
DRG 469
0.319
1.376
DRG 470
0.000
Presence of a Hip Fracture
Hip Fracture Present
0.367
1.443
Metropolitan Statistical Area Characteristics
Log MSA Population
-0.047
0.954

0.142

0.221

0.779

3.520

<.0001*

0.142
0.155
0.143
0.082
0.188
0.000

0.140
1.009
0.244
0.122
-0.233
0.000

0.695
1.617
0.803
0.442
0.504
0.000

2.950
8.470
3.670
3.460
0.720

0.003*
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.001*
0.470
.

0.001
0.000

-0.027
0.000

-0.021
0.000

-16.730
22.110

<.0001*
<.0001*

0.008
0.006
0.010
0.013
0.012
0.020
0.000

-0.011
0.076
-0.011
0.010
0.015
0.017
0.000

0.022
0.098
0.030
0.059
0.062
0.095
0.000

0.670
15.660
0.920
2.790
3.150
2.790

0.504
<.0001*
0.356
0.005*
0.002*
0.005*
.

0.000

0.018

0.019

73.010

<.0001*

0.002
0.000

-0.055
0.000

-0.046
0.000

-21.980
.

<.0001*
.

0.007
0.000

0.306
0.000

0.332
0.000

47.850
.

<.0001*
.

0.005

0.357

0.377

72.040

<.0001*

0.085

-0.213

0.119

-0.550

0.580

.

.

Notes:
* Significant at the α=.05 level
† DRG: 469: Major Hip/Knee Joint Replacement Or Reattachment Of Lower Extremity With MCC Or Total Ankle
Replacement; DRG 470: Major Hip/Knee Joint Replacement Or Reattachment Of Lower Extremity Without MCC
Or Total Ankle Replacement
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Impact Stratified by Measures of Safety-Net Status
Stratification by Medicaid Percent
Table 18 displays the difference in difference estimates for the model specified above fit separately for
each quartile of total discharges attributable to Medicaid patients (Medicaid percent). Episodes
originating at anchor hospitals assigned to the treatment group reduced payments 4.5% more than
control facilities among episodes originating at anchor hospitals falling in the bottom quartile of
Medicaid percent (p=.0013). No significant difference in the change in price standardized payments was
observed between the treatment or control groups for episodes originating at anchor hospitals falling in
the second quartile of Medicaid Percent. Among anchor hospitals falling in the third and fourth quartiles
of Medicaid percent respectively, CJR participation was associated with payment reductions of 3.5%
(p=.0028) and 3.7% (p=.0019) more than control facilities.
Table 18: DID Estimators from Analysis Stratified by Medicaid Percent
Quartile:
Medicaid
Percent

DID
Estimator

1

-0.0457

0.9553

0.0142

-0.0736

-0.0178

-3.21

0.0013*

2

-0.0214

0.9788

0.0142

-0.0491

0.0064

-1.51

0.1317

3

-0.0354

0.9652

0.0119

-0.0587

-0.0122

-2.99

0.0028*

4

-0.0367

0.9640

0.0118

-0.0599

-0.0135

-3.1

0.0019*

Exp(Est)

Standard
Error

Lower
CL

Upper
CL

Z

ProbZ

Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

To provide test of whether a significant difference exists across quartiles, a difference in
differences in differences (DDD) model was fit, which interacted the DID estimate with a flag for
episodes originating at hospitals in the top quartile of Medicaid percent. Table 19 displays the results of
a type 3 analysis of the main effects for the DDD estimator. The main effect of the DDD model was
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insignificant indicating that there no significant difference in the difference in difference estimator
observed between episodes originating in each strata.
Table 19: Type III Tests of Model Effects for SSI DDD Model
Effect

Num DF

Chi-Square
0.09

Pr > ChiSq

Exposure

1

0.7642

Treatment

0

Treatment*Exposure

1

32.72

<.0001*

Exposure*Medicaid Percent Quartile

3

5.01

0.1711

Treatment*Exposure*Medicaid Percent Quartile

6

8.07

0.5276

.

.

* Significant at the α=.05 level

Stratification by SSI Percent
Table 20 displays the difference in difference estimates for episodes originating at hospitals in each
quartile of SSI percent of Medicare Discharges (SSI Percent). Among Episodes that originated in anchor
hospitals falling in the lowest SSI Percent quartile, CJR participation was found to be associated with a
statistically significant differential decrease in average price standardized total episode payments of
3.9% (p=.0014). As was observed when stratifying by Medicaid percent, there was no significant
difference observed between the trend in average price standardized episode payments between the
treatment and control groups for episodes originating at anchor hospitals falling in the second quartile
of SSI percent. For episodes originating in anchor hospitals falling in the top two quartiles of quartiles of
SSI percent, CJR was associated with statistically significant reductions of 4.0% (p=.0002) and 4.2%
(p=.0027) in average price standardized episode payments respectively in comparison to control
episodes.
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Table 20: DID Estimators from Analyses stratified by SSI Percent
Quartile:
SSI Percent

DID
Estimator

Exp(Est)

Standard
Error

Lower CL

Upper CL

Z

ProbZ

1

-0.0395

0.9613

0.0123

-0.0637

-0.0153

-3.2

0.0014*

2

-0.0168

0.9833

0.0104

-0.0372

0.0037

-1.61

0.1076

3

-0.0408

0.9600

0.0111

-0.0625

-0.0191

-3.69

0.0002*

4

-0.0432

0.9577

0.0144

-0.0714

-0.0149

-3

0.0027*

Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

A difference in differences in differences (DDD) model examining the difference in the DID
estimators between the highest SSI percent quartile and all other quartiles did not indicate a significant
DDD estimator. Therefore, we do not have evidence that there was a significant difference in the
difference in difference estimator observed between SSI percent strata. Table 21 displays the results of a
type 3 analysis of the main effect for the DDD estimator.
Table 21: Type III Tests of Model Effects for SSI DDD Model
Effect
Exposure
Treatment
Treatment*Exposure
Exposure*SSI Percent Quartile

Num DF

Treatment*Exposure*SSI Percent Quartile
Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level
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1
0
1
3

Chi-Square
0.19
.
34.36
1.47

Pr > ChiSq
0.6655
.
<.0001*
0.6898

9

3.03

0.8056

Stratification by DSH Percent
Table 22 displays the difference in difference estimates for episodes originating at hospitals in
each quartile of SSI percent of Medicare Discharges (SSI Percent). Among Episodes that originated in
anchor hospitals falling in the lowest two DSH Percent quartiles, CJR participation was found to be
associated with a statistically significant differential decrease average price standardized total episode
payments of 3.3% (p=.0203) and 3.5% (p=.0032) respectively. For episodes originating in anchor
hospitals falling in the top two quartiles of quartiles of SSI percent, CJR was associated with statistically
significant reductions of 4.2% (p<.0001) and 4.0% (p=.0008) in average price standardized episode
payments respectively in comparison to control episodes.
Table 22: DID Estimators from Analyses stratified by DSH Patient Percent

Quartile:
DSH
Percent

DID
Estimator

Exp (Est)

Standard
Error

Lower CL

Upper CL

Z

ProbZ

1

-0.0339

0.9667

0.0146

-0.0625

-0.0053

-2.32

0.0203*

2

-0.0354

0.9652

0.0120

-0.0589

-0.0119

-2.95

0.0032*

3

-0.0426

0.9583

0.0106

-0.0634

-0.0218

-4.01

<.0001*

4

-0.0408

0.9600

0.0122

-0.0647

-0.0169

-3.35

0.0008*

Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

As with analyses of difference-in-difference-in-difference models interacting treatment, exposure, and
the SSI or Medicaid quartiles, the DDD estimator produced when interacting treatment, exposure and
the DSH quartile produced an insignificant type 3 main effect, indicating that the change in the DID
estimators in each strata are not significantly different from one another. The results of this analysis are
provided in Table 23.
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Table 23: Type III Tests of Model Effects for DSH DDD Model

Effect
Exposure
Treatment
DSH Quartile
Treatment*Exposure
Exposure*DSH Percent Quartile
Treatment*Exposure*DSH Percent Quartile

Num DF
1
0
3
1
3
6

Chi-Square
0.15
.
2.80
32.52
1.31
3.73

Pr > ChiSq
0.6946
.
0.4231
<.0001*
0.7257
0.7126

Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

CJR Impact by Payment Type/Care Setting
Table 24 displays the results of part I of the two-part model examining differences in payments
by payment type. The table presents the difference in difference estimator produced by logistic
regression models in which the dependent variable is a binary indicator of having a given payment type.
The coefficient estimates represent the difference in the difference of the log odds of having a given
payment type for the treatment group compared to the control group. Note, as all providers have index
and overall inpatient payments, part 1 was not run for these payments. After implementation the odds
of a non-index inpatient payment (p=.0001) or IRF payment (p=<.0001) decreased more for episodes
originating at CJR anchor hospitals as compared to the treatment group. On the contrary, the odds of
any home health payment increased more in the treatment group than the control group (p=.03).
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Table 24: Part I: DID Results of Logistic Models by Payment Type

Payment Type

DID
Estimator

St.
Error

Lower CL

Upper CL

Z

P

Non-Index Inpatient Payments

-0.2268

0.0646

-0.3534

-0.1001

-3.5100

<.0001*

Home Health Payments

0.1301

0.0600

0.0125

0.2478

2.1700

0.0300*

IRF Payments

-0.4504

0.0899

-0.6266

-0.2741

-5.0100

<.0001*

SNF Payments

-0.0278

0.0539

-0.1335

0.0779

-0.5200

0.6060

Outpatient Payments

-0.0072

0.0353

-0.2000

0.8380

-0.0763

0.0619

Carrier Payments

-0.1058

0.0607

-0.2246

0.0131

-1.7400

0.0810

Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

Table 25 displays the results of part 2 of the two-part model. These results represent separate
difference-in-difference estimates within each care setting among individuals with a payment in that
setting. After controlling for covariates, a statistically significant differential reduction in average
episode payments was observed in the treatment group compared to the control group for inpatient
claims, and professional (carrier) claims. Average price standardized inpatient episode payments
decreased by $367 more in the treatment group as compared to the control group (p=<.0001). No
statistically significant difference between the change in average price standardized inpatient episode
payments specific to the anchor admission was found. A reduction of $968 in average price standardized
episode payments for subsequent admissions was observed, but was only significant at the 10 percent
confidence level (p=.0750). This indicates that payment reductions in the inpatient setting may be
partially due to reductions in payments for admissions after the initial lower extremity joint
replacement, rather than changes in the care provided during the initial surgical procedure. Among
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individuals with an inpatient rehabilitation claim, average payments for inpatient rehabilitation claims
increased by $1083 (P=.0425) more in the treatment group compared to the control group.
Table 25:DID Results of Linear Models by Payment Type
Setting

N
108,862

Estimate
-367.18

St. Error
87.94

Lower CL
-539.67

Upper CL
-194.68

Z
-4.18

Prob Z
<.0001*

108,862

-84.22

55.33

-192.75

24.31

-1.52

0.1280

8,989

-968.00

543.95

-2,034.13

98.13

-1.78

0.0750

Inpatient Rehab

6,921

1,083.04

402.56

294.05

1,872.03

2.69

0.0070*

Skilled Nursing Facility

38,756

-454.85

285.28

-1,013.99

104.29

-1.59

0.1110

Outpatient Hospital

49,586

-24.24

42.76

-108.06

59.57

-0.57

0.5710

Inpatient
Inpatient: Anchor
Inpatient: Non-Anchor

Home Health

65,185

-61.83

38.39

-137.07

13.40

-1.61

0.1070

Carrier

101,490

-129.75

35.93

-200.18

-59.32

-3.61

<.0001*

Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

Table 26 displays the effects estimated by the combined two-part model, which reflect the incremental
effect of CJR on each payment type, not only in individuals with a payment. Note, as all individuals have
inpatient and inpatient anchor payments, the results presented for these payment types are the same.
Non-index payments were found to have reduced by $260 in CJR participants compared to control
(P<.0001). After accounting for both parts of the two part model, CJR participation was found to be
associated with a $328 decrease in inpatient rehabilitation payments compared (P<.0001). Lastly, CJR
participation was found to be associated with a $142 decrease in carrier payments (P<.0001).
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Table 26: DID Results of Combined Two-part Models

108,862

Estimate
-367.18

Delta
Method
St. Error
87.94

Lower CL
-539.67

Upper CL
-194.68

Z
-4.18

Prob Z
<.0001

108,862

-84.22

55.33

-192.75

24.31

-1.52

0.1280

8,989

-259.44

68.90

-394.48

-124.41

-3.77

<.0001

Inpatient Rehab

6,921

-328.40

84.71

-494.43

-162.36

-3.88

<.0001

Skilled Nursing Facility

38,756

-220.01

147.56

-509.22

69.20

-1.49

0.1360

Outpatient Hospital

49,586

-12.71

21.12

-0.60

0.55

-54.11

28.6872

Home Health

65,185

60.83

50.69

-38.52

160.18

1.20

0.2300

101,490

-142.39

35.68

-212.32

-72.46

-3.99

<.0001

Setting
Inpatient
Inpatient: Anchor
Inpatient: Non-Anchor

Carrier

N

Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

Impact by Payment Type/Care Setting and Safety-Net Status
Table 27 displays results of a Wald test on the DDD estimator, which interacts the difference in
difference estimator with the Medicaid quartile, from separate two-part DDD models fit for each
payment type. As was observed with total price standardized episode payments, no statistical difference
was found between the differential change in price standardized payments between the treatment and
control group between Medicaid percent strata.
Table 27: Wald Test for Differences by Medicaid Percent

Payment Type
Inpatient (Index + Non-Index)
Index Admissions
Non-Index Inpatient Admissions
Home Health
Inpatient Rehab
Skilled Nursing Facilities
Outpatient Hospital
Professional
Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

F
0.34
0.20
Chi-Square
15.5
4.47
3.88
4.68
2.91
5.91

Pr > F
0.7972
0.8944
Pr>ChiSq
0.078
0.6137
0.6932
0.5854
0.8205
0.4335

Table 28 displays results of a Wald test on the DDD estimator, which interacts the difference in
difference estimator with the SSI quartile, from separate two-part DDD models fit for each payment
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type are equal to zero. No statistical difference was found between the differential change in price
standardized payments between the treatment and control group between SSI percent strata for all
types of payment.
Table 28: Wald Test for Differences by SSI Quartile
Payment Type

F

Pr > F

Inpatient (Index + Non-Index)

0.11

0.9520

Index Admissions

0.27

0.8482

Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

3.81

0.7025

10.81

0.0946

Inpatient Rehab

5.70

0.4576

Skilled Nursing Facilities

2.59

0.588

Outpatient Hospital

4.35

0.6289

Professional

4.02

0.6739

Non-Index Inpatient Admissions
Home Health

Note: * Significant at the α=.05 level

Sensitivity Analyses
Exclusion of Episodes Beginning in 2018
To test if our results are robust to the impact of the changes to the participation requirements that were
implemented in early 2018, a model was fit including only episodes that began through the end of 2017.
Table 29 includes the results of that analysis. Excluding episodes beginning in 2018 did not meaningfully
impact the results of our analysis. In the limited analysis, episodes originating at anchor hospitals in the
treatment group reduced 3.3% more than in control facilities (p=.0331). Our original model estimated
this impact to be 3.5%. The result of Type 3 analyses for the main effect of a DDD estimator interacting
the Difference in Difference estimator with SSI percent quartile and Medicaid quartile respectively were
both insignificant.
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Table 29: Sensitivity Analysis: Main Model Excluding 2018
Covariate

Estimate

Intercept

11.323

Difference in Differences
Treatment
0.488
Control
0.000
Post-Implementation
0.018
Pre-Implementation
0.000
DID Estimator Treatment *
-0.034
Post-Implementation
Year
2012
-0.017
2013
-0.013
2014
-0.026
2015
-0.135
2016
-0.353
2017
-0.373
2011
0.000
Hospital Characteristics
Anchor Hospital Safety Net Status
Medicaid Percent of Total
-0.091
Discharges
SSI Percent of Medicare
0.023
Discharges
Anchor Hospital Size
0-50 Beds
0.068
51-100 Beds
0.033
101-200 Beds
0.005
500+ Beds
0.014
200-500 Beds
0.000
Anchor Hospital Ownership
For-profit
-0.004
Government
0.038
Other
0.007
Non-profit
0.000
Anchor Hospital Medical School Affiliation
Major
-0.012
Limited
0.003
Graduate
0.024
No Affiliation
0.000
Anchor Hospital CMS Region
1 (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT)
0.502
2 (NJ, NY, PR, VI)
0.583
3 (DE, DC, MD, PA, VA, WV)
0.389

exp
(Estimate)

LowerCL

UpperCL

1.059

9.247

13.398

10.690

<.0001*

0.025
0.000
0.007
0.000

0.439
0.000
0.006
0.000

0.538
0.000
0.031
0.000

19.320

<.0001*
.
0.0049*
.

0.967

0.006

-0.045

-0.022

-5.690

<.0001*

0.984
0.987
0.974
0.874
0.702
0.689

0.005
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.009
0.010
0.000

-0.026
-0.023
-0.037
-0.147
-0.370
-0.393
0.000

-0.007
-0.003
-0.016
-0.123
-0.336
-0.354
0.000

-3.560
-2.510
-4.770
-22.230
-40.890
-37.820

0.0004*
0.0119*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
.

0.913

0.062

-0.212

0.030

-1.480

0.140

1.023

0.001

0.020

0.025

18.430

<.0001*

1.070
1.034
1.005
1.014

0.039
0.020
0.009
0.012
0.000

-0.009
-0.005
-0.013
-0.008
0.000

0.145
0.072
0.022
0.037
0.000

1.730
1.710
0.510
1.220

0.084
0.087
0.611
0.221
.

0.015
0.017
0.011
0.000

-0.033
0.005
-0.016
0.000

0.025
0.071
0.029
0.000

-0.290
2.270
0.570

0.770
0.0231*
0.565
.

0.013
0.010
0.023
0.000

-0.037
-0.017
-0.020
0.000

0.014
0.023
0.069
0.000

-0.890
0.280
1.070

0.371
0.777
0.283
.

0.196
0.145
0.144

0.117
0.298
0.106

0.887
0.868
0.672

2.550
4.010
2.700

0.0106*
<.0001*
0.007*

1.629
1.018

0.996
1.039
1.007

0.988
1.003
1.025

1.652
1.791
1.476
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Stderr

Z

ProbZ

.
2.810
.

.

.

.

.

4 (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC,
0.610
1.840
SC, TN)
5 (IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI)
0.521
1.683
6 (AK, LA, NM, OK, TX)
1.420
4.139
7 (IA, KS, MO, NE)
0.651
1.917
8 (CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY)
0.337
1.401
9 (AZ, CA, HI, NV, PT)
0.266
1.305
10 (AK, ID, OR, WA)
0.000
Beneficiary/Episode Characteristics
Beneficiary Age
Age
-0.025
0.975
Age-Squared
0.000
1.000
Beneficiary Race/Ethnicity
Black
0.091
1.095
Asian
0.034
1.034
Hispanic
0.039
1.039
North American Native
0.059
1.061
Other
0.004
1.004
Unknown Race
0.001
1.001
White
0.000
Beneficiary Count of Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC)
HCC Count
0.018
1.018
Beneficiary Sex
Male
-0.051
0.950
Female
0.000

0.152

0.312

0.907

4.010

<.0001*

0.152
0.165
0.153
0.085
0.201
0.000

0.224
1.096
0.351
0.170
-0.128
0.000

0.818
1.745
0.951
0.504
0.660
0.000

3.430
8.590
4.250
3.960
1.320

0.0006*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.186
.

0.002
0.000

-0.028
0.000

-0.022
0.000

-16.760
22.080

<.0001*
<.0001*

0.006
0.013
0.013
0.022
0.011
0.010
0.000

0.079
0.007
0.014
0.016
-0.017
-0.018
0.000

0.102
0.060
0.064
0.102
0.026
0.019
0.000

15.570
2.500
3.050
2.670
0.410
0.070

<.0001*
0.0124*
0.0023*
0.0076*
0.680
0.943
.

0.000

0.018

0.019

63.120

<.0001*

0.002
0.000

-0.056
0.000

-0.047
0.000

-21.010
.

<.0001*
.

0.007
0.000

0.318
0.000

0.345
0.000

47.500
.

<.0001*
.

1.454

0.005

0.364

0.385

69.270

<.0001*

0.913

0.091

-0.270

0.089

-0.990

0.322

.

.

Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) of Episode Anchor Admission
DRG 469
DRG 470

0.332
0.000

1.393

Presence of a Hip Fracture
Hip Fracture Present
0.374
Metropolitan Statistical Area Characteristics
Log MSA Population
-0.091

Notes:
* Significant at the α=.05 level
† DRG: 469: Major Hip/Knee Joint Replacement Or Reattachment Of Lower Extremity With MCC Or Total Ankle
Replacement; DRG 470: Major Hip/Knee Joint Replacement Or Reattachment Of Lower Extremity Without MCC
Or Total Ankle Replacement

Varying the Time of Exposure
To account for the possibility that providers began implementing changes to their processes at a time
that does not align with the official start of the CJR program, two alternate definitions of the time of
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exposure were assessed. First, the time of exposure was defined as the time at which the CJR model and
its associated details were finalized and announced (fourth quarter 2015). Second, to account for the
possibility that providers may not have been able to begin implementing changes until well after the
stated beginning of the model, a model was that included a buffer period that included the time
between announcement and a full quarter after the beginning of the program. This buffer period results
in the exclusion of episodes that began in either the fourth quarter of 2015 or first quarter of 2016.
Table 30 displays the difference in difference results of the original model, and the results of each
sensitivity analysis. Defining exposure as the time of announcement results in an estimated effect of CJR
roughly .24 percentage points lower. The effect remains significant (p<.0001). Defining exposure after
an excluded buffer period resulted in a .42 percentage point reduction in the estimated effect of CJR.
Again this effect remained significant (p<.0001).
Table 30: Sensitivity Analysis: Main Model with Varied Time of Exposure

Implementation
Covariate

Estimate

Prob Z

Announcement
Estimate

Prob Z

Buffer
Estimate

Prob Z

Difference in Differences
0.4882

1.629381

<.0001*

0.4654

<.0001*

0.4711

1.6018

<.0001*

PostImplementation

0.0181

1.018265

0.0049*

-0.2467

<.0001*

0.0199

1.0201

0.0021*

DID Estimator
Treatment*PostImplementation

-0.0337

0.966862

<.0001*

-0.0312

<.0001*

-0.0355

0.9651

<.0001*

Treatment

* Significant at the α=.05 level

Testing an Alternative Covariance Structure
To assess if our choice of covariance structure may be resulting in inaccurate results, a model was fit
specifying an exchangeable covariance structure in place of the autoregressive structure that is specified
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in our main analysis. The QIC fit statistic, and DID results for each model are presented in table 31. Both
covariance structures appear to have similar fit, and produce nearly identical results.
Table 31: Alternative Covariance Structure

QIC Fit Statistic

Autoregressive

Exchangeable

99638.57

99637.97

Effect

Num DF

Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Num DF

Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Exposure

1

0.14

0.7072

1

0.13

0.7135

Treatment

0

.

.

0

.

.

Treatment*Exposure

1

35.86

<.0001*

1

35.37

<.0001*

* Significant at the α=.05 level
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Summary and Discussion of Results
These findings add to the growing body of evidence supporting the ability of episode-based
payment models to reduce expenditures for lower extremity joint replacement episodes. 10,13–17 Our
analysis found that CJR resulted in significant reductions in payments to participants in comparison to a
control group. We found that these payment reductions were likely due to reductions in admissions
subsequent to lower extremity joint surgery and in payments for inpatient rehabilitation services. We
did not find that payment reductions varied based on provider safety net status. The magnitude and
direction of the effects estimated by this analysis are largely in line with the results produced by prior
research. 14–17
The first aim of this analysis was to determine if total, inpatient, physician, skilled nursing,
inpatient rehabilitation, and home health care payments for lower extremity joint replacement episodes
originating at CJR participating hospitals, hereafter referred to as CJR episodes, decreased more than for
episodes that originated at a comparable set of non-participating hospitals, hereafter referred to as nonCJR episodes. The hypothesis associated with this aim was twofold: first that overall payments for CJR
episodes decreases significantly more than for non-CJR episodes, and second that payment reductions
would be most pronounced in the institutional post-acute setting. The results of this analysis support
the hypothesis that the CJR program resulted in a differential decrease in total LEJR payments for CJR
episodes in comparison to non-CJR episodes. Our finding of a 3.5% reduction in LEJR average price
standardized episode payments is in line with previously generated evidence. For example, the official
year 3 CJR evaluation estimated a 3.7% reduction in payments attributable to CJR when including all
original participants, and without accounting for outpatient LEJR episodes.17
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The evidence supporting the hypothesis that payment reductions would be most pronounced in
the institutional post-acute care setting was mixed. The results indicate that reductions in price
standardized Inpatient payments, inpatient non-anchor admission payments, inpatient rehabilitation
and professional payments were greater for CJR participants relative to the control group. Inpatient
payment reductions were generally due to reductions in payment for hospitalizations after the initial
procedure, rather than reductions in payments associated with the anchor hospitalization itself.
Interestingly, the results indicate that payments for Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility services decreased
overall, but this decrease was likely due to a reduced probability of admission to an IRF. Examining
payments for those episodes that had an IRF payment indicated that average payments increased for
the treatment group relative to the control group. The finding of overall payment reductions in the IRF
setting is in line with prior evaluations of the CJR program.16,17 Our findings related to the decreased
probability of admission to an IRF are also in line with prior evaluations. It is worth noting that only
6921, or 6%, of episodes met the inclusion criteria for the sample and included IRF payments. IRF
utilization after LEJR has declined precipitously across our study period. MedPAC estimates that IRF
stays for LEJR decreased 62 percent between 2009 and 2018.129 A similar decrease is observed in our
dataset. Between 2011 and 2018 the number of LEJR episodes meeting our inclusion criteria and
including IRF payments decreased by 70 percent. Furthermore, this reduction was more pronounced in
the treatment group than the control group (78% and 62% respectively). It is likely that the cases that
remained were higher cost cases that required inpatient rehabilitation as opposed to care in a less
complex setting.
The second aim of this study was to determine if the effect of the CJR program on payments was
different for safety net providers. This question was examined through stratification by three measures
of safety net status, along with the interaction of those measures with our indicators of exposure and
implementation. The hypothesis for this aim was that the difference between treatment and control
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would be diminished among episodes originating at providers with higher levels of each measure of
safety-net status. The findings of this analysis do not support this hypothesis. Instead, these findings
demonstrate that safety-net providers, defined either based on SSI percent, Medicaid percent, or the
DSH patient percentage were able to produce payment reductions at similar rates to non-safety net
providers in the initial years of the CJR model. Yet, prior research has found that safety net providers,
defined as being above the median level of DSH patient percentage, earned significantly lower average
reconciliation payments per episode.16 While these findings may seem at odds, they are instead two
pieces of a likely complicated problem, and may point to a structural disadvantage built into the design
of the CJR model. To generate shared savings, hospitals average episode spending must be less than a
pre-defined target price, and they must achieve a minimum level of performance on several quality
metrics. Over 90% of participating hospitals achieve at least the minimum permissible Performance on
quality metrics and therefore quality does not appear to be a major barrier to eligibility for shared
savings. If, however, there is a systematic difference between the performance of safety net providers
and the performance of non-safety net providers, differences in the level of earned shared savings could
be in part due to differences in quality. There is also the possibility that target prices could
disproportionately disadvantage safety-net providers. Target prices for performance years 1-3, which
are the performance years covered by this analysis, were based on a blend of hospital historical
performance and a regional average. The results of our analysis indicate that episodes originating at
safety-net providers tend to be more expensive, after controlling for covariates. Since a sizeable amount
of the benchmark price is regional, it is possible that safety-net providers on average must reduce
payments a greater amount to generate shared savings. If true, this disadvantage would worsen in
performance years 4-6, when the proportion of the target price that is based on the regional average
increases to 100 percent.31,39

91

Limitations
The analyses presented have several significant limitations. First, our results may not be
generalizable to the non-Medicare population. Medicare patients are older and sicker than the general
population, and therefore there may be less ability to safely vary care processes to generate payment
reductions. On the other hand, Medicare payment programs have a wide reach. Nearly forty percent of
inpatient days are attributable to Medicare patients.130 Therefore, changes in care processes may spill
over into the larger patient population. For example, qualitative evidence from the official CJR
evaluations does indicate that changes in care management were sometimes made regardless of the
patients CJR status.
These results also may not be generalizable to other clinical episodes. The CJR model is focused on lower
extremity joint replacements including hip, knee, and ankle replacements. These procedures are
common, and payments for such procedures have been found to be highly variable across providers,
making them a suitable clinical episode for bundled payment. 30,31 Bundled payment models focused on
different clinical episodes may not have the same ability to generate savings if provider behavior is less
modifiable, or payments vary less resulting in less opportunity for improvement.
Next, the dataset includes only individuals that are included in the CMS five percent sample.
CMS determines the five percent sample by first identifying a random 20 percent sample of beneficiaries
based on their Medicare Claim Account Number. CMS then breaks that sample into several smaller
samples including a 1 percent, four percent, and 15 percent sample. The five percent sample includes
beneficiaries flagged for the one and four percent samples. These samples are cross sectional, but the
criteria for inclusion based on claim account number does not change. As beneficiaries die, new
beneficiaries become eligible, and in the event of a change in a beneficiaries claim account number,
beneficiaries may be added or dropped from the sample in a given year. Therefore, the five percent
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sample includes largely the same beneficiaries as the previous year, but will not represent a consistent
random sample across the study period. This may be less likely in our sample, which is comprised of
lower extremity joint replacement patients, as these patients tend to be on the younger end of the
Medicare age range. Second, prior to 2017 there was no indicator in the beneficiary file, which was
known as the denominator file prior to 2017 and the Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) beginning
in 2017, that identified beneficiaries included in the sample. For purposes of our analysis, we identified
these beneficiaries by collecting the unique set of beneficiary identification numbers from the union of
the carrier and durable medical equipment limited data sets, which were the two settings in which our
data was limited to the five percent sample. If an individual did not have a carrier or DME claim and
were not a part of the sample in 2017 or 2018, which is unlikely but possible, they would not have been
identified as being part of the sample, and their episodes would not have been included in our final
dataset. An additional shortcoming of our analysis that is a result of relying on a sample of claims data is
the inability to translate our findings into meaningful estimates of savings attributable to the Medicare
program.
Next, out of necessity we are using Medicare payments as a proxy for costs. Ideally costs would
be used as the dependent variable, which would provide a more meaningful representation of
differences in practice between providers provided the cost is accurately captured. Medicare pays for
care in many settings, including hospital care, Skilled Nursing Facility Care, Inpatient Rehabilitation
Facility Care, and Home Health Care, through prospective payment systems. These payment systems
tend to reimburse a set amount for defined episodes, adjusted for geography, certain provider
characteristics, and extreme costliness, rather than a separate amount for each service that is
provided.131 Therefore, after standardizing prices to account for adjustments, two providers treating an
identical patient will receive the same payment, regardless of differences in the cost or volume of
services that are provided. Our analysis intentionally included outlier payments, which provide extra
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reimbursement for particularly costly cases, and pass-through/per-diem payments, which include
reimbursement to providers for certain services that are not included in the episode-based payment.
The differential reductions in inpatient payments that were observed are likely due in large part to
differences in these elements of the inpatient payment.
Costs, on the other hand, if properly calculated and standardized across providers, would
instead provide a measure of resource use associated with each episode, as every service provided
would increase the costliness of the episode. Unfortunately, costs are notoriously difficult to calculate
from administrative data. The most common method is to reduce charges, which are available on the
administrative record, to costs using an overall hospital ratio of cost to charges. This ratio is available for
institutional providers certified by Medicare through the Healthcare Cost Report Information System
(HCRIS), but is not available for professional providers.112 In addition, an overall facility ratio of cost to
charges can produce significantly biased approximations of costs within service lines. Providers may
have significantly different mark ups depending on the type of care or department. For example, the
difference between costs and charges for surgical procedures may be very different than for medical
procedures. Furthermore, this difference is not standard across facilities. Therefore, an overall RCC will
likely overestimate costs for some, and underestimate costs for others, but not in a way that can be
easily standardized across facilities. 132 If these differences are systematic, we may introduce significant
bias by relying on inappropriately calculated costs. An alternative would be to analyze data only for
hospitals that have detailed cost accounting systems. There are several practical barriers to such an
analysis. First, many providers do not have such systems in place, and those that do are likely larger,
wealthier providers. Second, those providers that do have cost accounting systems do not make these
data publicly available. Some larger vendors of cost accounting services are able to comingle and analyze
these data among their clients, but the results of an analysis in partnership with such an organization
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would be limited in terms of generalizability, as it would only include episodes at facilities that purchase
that product.
Next, the control group that was constructed for this analysis had important differences in terms
of the clinical and demographic characteristics of the patients, and the characteristics of the anchor
hospitals that were assigned to the treatment and control group. This analysis did not employ
sophisticated matching techniques, instead relying on statistical adjustment to account for these
differences. While we did not create a matched control group, nor did we weight our control group
using the randomization weights employed when CMS selected participant geographic areas, we did
adjust for several variables found to be different between treatment and control. In addition, we
included both hospital and MSA fixed effects which should have further improved comparability.
Concerns regarding comparability persist in any non-experimental design where the treatment is not
controlled. Of particular concern is the potential violation of the parallel trends assumption, which is a
main assumption of the DID model. Importantly, our assessment of parallel trends, both graphical and
statistical, indicated only minor potential violations of this assumption. Future research should employ
methods that take further steps to mitigate violations of the parallel trends assumption, as violations
may result in biased estimates.
Next, the model that was developed to test the impact of total price standardized episode payments
generally accounts for differences due to the characteristics of the anchor hospital, clinical
characteristics of the beneficiary, and the MSA in which the anchor hospital was located. Importantly,
the analysis does not account for differences in the type of non-hospital providers that provided care in
the episode. The analysis is not adjusted for differences in non-hospital providers because it is believed
that these differences may be important drivers of episode spending. For example, providers that are
successful in generating payment reductions on average may have done so in part by discharging
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patients to larger post-acute care providers. In effect, this was part of their intervention, and should be
captured in the overall estimate of the impact of CJR participation on payments.
Finally, the above analysis only includes data through year 3 of the model. Moreover, the final
quarter of performance year 3 (2018) was excluded to ensure that we were not measuring payments for
incomplete episodes. Therefore, this analysis accounts for less than half of the original duration of the
CJR model. Moreover, data covering episodes originating in 2018 may have biased the results of the
analysis, because the participation requirements were changed beginning January 1, 2018. Hospitals in
some MSAs were granted a one-time opportunity to opt-out of the model at that time. The main
analysis employed an intent-to treat analysis, and therefore included hospitals that opted-out in the
control group, which suggests our results could be underestimated. Through sensitivity analyses, it was
determined that results through 2017 were in line with results produced by the full model, but biased
results cannot be ruled out.

Suggestions for Future Research
First, research should focus on outcomes that allow inferences to be made regarding differences
in provider behavior. If payments are reduced without associated reductions in provider costs, or
meaningful improvements in the quality of care that is provided, then episode payment models
essentially amount to reduced payment rates. Potential outcomes that warrant further exploration
include provider costs, quantity of procedures, and setting specific measures of healthcare quality.
Next, robust assessments of payment reductions within payment care settings that include
deeper examinations of the drivers of payment reductions within each setting is warranted. The current
body of evidence has yet to come to consensus on how payment reductions are generated. For example,
researchers may assess whether payment reductions in the post-acute setting are due to differences in
the providers to which patients are discharged, or to behavioral and operational changes and a relatively
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consistent set of providers. That is, are hospitals changing their network of partners to work with more
efficient downstream providers, or are downstream providers becoming more efficient. Furthermore,
research should identify how distinct elements of setting specific payments are changing. For example,
have pass through or outlier payments changed more in facilities subject to CJR than those that are not?
This could give valuable insight into whether or not selection is driving payment reductions.
Evidence regarding the impact of these models on quality is less prevalent than evidence related
to payment reductions. Future research should prioritize these analyses to ensure that payment
reductions are not at the expense of patients. It is important that future research examine the impact on
both the quality measures that are measured as part of the program, and measures that are not
measured and paid for by Medicare to assess whether improvements in measured quality are at the
expense of non-measured quality. Furthermore, changes in the quality of care provided beyond the
hospital setting should be thoroughly studied. It is important to understand if payment reductions in the
post-acute care setting are being generated by inappropriate reductions in post-acute services, or by
partnering with lower cost providers that may provide lower quality care.
Importantly, the year 4 official evaluation of the CJR program does assess post-acute, and nonmeasured quality. First, the claims based, difference in difference evaluation of the impact of CJR on
quality included the unplanned readmission rate, mortality rate, and Emergency Department utilization
as outcomes. These are all measures that are not directly tied to payment through the CJR program. The
author’s found that the elective LEJR complication rate, which is directly measured in CJR, and
unplanned readmission rate, which was not directly linked to payment, improved significantly for CJR
episodes compared to non-CJR episodes. There was no observed statistical difference in mortality or
emergency department utilization. The evaluation also evaluated performance on several patient
reported outcomes for a subset of Medicare patients through a supplemental survey and an analysis of
patient assessments in the post-acute setting, finding that CJR patients had similar self-reported changes
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in functional status and pain, both overall and in the PAC setting, but that CJR participants required
more assistance from caregivers upon return to the home. Importantly, the authors found that patients
that experienced hip fractures reported less improvement in functional status in pain.16 Therefore,
assessments of the impact on quality should focus on determining the impact on distinct subpopulations
within the overall Medicare LEJR population, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable patients.
The potential unique experience of safety-net providers remains an important area for
continued research. Safety-net providers tend to be less financially stable than non-safety net providers,
and therefore understanding the intricacies of their experience with value-based payment arrangements
is paramount to ensuring that the safety-net is not weakened to the detriment of the Nation’s most
vulnerable patients. 21,133,134 Current evidence suggests that safety-net providers are less likely to earn
shared savings in episode-based payment models.20 Yet, the results of this analysis, along with at least
one other study indicate that changes in payments attributable to episode based payment models are
not significantly different among safety-net providers.135 Future research should first focus on
thoroughly understanding how results vary for safety-net providers compared to non-safety net
providers rather than relying solely on patient level measures of SES. For example, models controlling
for dual eligibility status of the patient, or some other measure of SES, will capture the differences in
episode spending associated with dual eligibility, but not the aggregate impact of increased safety net
burden on providers. While the patient experience should be paramount, and the patient level effect
should be understood, it is important to examine hospital level indicators of safety-net status, as is done
in this research. The aggregate impact of SES on payments within a model is not necessarily equivalent
to the full impact of treating a patient population that is comprised of a large proportion of safety-net
patients (i.e. safety-net providers). A potential barrier to understanding this relationship is the definition
of a safety-net hospital, or the level safety-net burden. There is growing recognition that current
definitions, or measures, used to identify safety net providers may not be adequate, and therefore
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research into potential alternative measures that can be used to identify safety-net providers is
necessary. 21,136
Next, the impact of specific elements of episode-based payment model design must be
understood. One design feature that must be scrutinized is the methodology for setting target prices.
There is some evidence that variations in price targets may be driving significant portions of payment
reductions in episode-based payment models, which has the potential to disadvantage certain providers
and the patients that they serve.16 Indeed, as mentioned above, this is one potential explanation for the
findings relating to the ability of safety-net providers to generate payment reductions, but not to earn
shared-savings. The impact of mandatory models compared to voluntary models should also be
explored. In particular, the likelihood of participation in voluntary models, and the potential for success,
across various categories of providers must be scrutinized. Voluntary models may attract providers that
are already efficient or high quality and therefore see an opportunity for profit through these models.
This selection could limit the impact of models, and concentrate benefits among patient populations
that already have high quality options. The conversion of the CJR model from fully mandatory, to
voluntary for some, may present a unique opportunity to study this issue.
In general, research over a longer post intervention period is necessary. While the current body
of research tends to indicate that payment reductions increase as more time increases postimplementation, it is unclear if this trend will continue indefinitely, or if reductions will naturally taper
off as participants approach some optimal standard of care. This is an important piece of information in
terms of model design. If benchmarks are designed with savings built in (i.e. empirical spending targets
are reduced by some amount for the sole purpose of generating savings) and the impact of the model
produces diminishing returns, then the model risks simply penalizing providers rather than providing a
meaningful incentive. The safety-net experience, and experience of other provider subgroups, will also
need to be studied after a longer implementation period, as it is possible that safety-net providers can
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generate initial savings by making low cost, high impact changes, but will be unable to sustain payment
reductions as further investment becomes necessary. Importantly, analyses over longer periods of time
will require careful consideration to account for differences across time periods to ensure that the
impact of the program, and not changes in context are being measured.
Lastly, research that demonstrates the broader impact, or potential impact, of episode-based
payment models is needed. There is a scarcity of research examining episode-based payment models
outside of the Medicare population. Furthermore, even within the Medicare LEJR population, it is
unclear if organizational changes that are generating payment reductions impact only Medicare patients
that are subject to CJR. For example, will providers that are in voluntary MSAs (post-2018) but chose not
to remain in the model benefit from efficiencies generated at their post-actue care partners that have
been incentivized by CJR through facilities that opted to remain in the model? In addition, the impact on
non-Medicare beneficiaries should be examined to better understand if any operational changes are
organization wide or are limited to Medicare beneficiaries.

Policy Implications
The research presented in the preceding chapters, and discussed here, providers further
evidence in support of episode-based payment models as an effective method to generate reduced
payments to providers of LEJR services. This evidence comes at a crucial time, as Medicare, along with
its advisors, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, are currently engaged in planning the future
of episode-based payment models within the Medicare program. While this research relied on slightly
different data and methods, our findings have largely validated the findings of CMS’ official evaluations.
Importantly, our findings related to Skilled Nursing Facility payments were contrary to the findings of
previously published research, and therefore this relationship should be explored further. 16,17

100

The findings presented related to the ability of safety-net providers to generate payment
reductions are also timely and provide needed evidence at a time in which Medicare, MedPAC and The
Innovation Center plan for the future of alternative payment models in the Medicare program. The
Innovation Center, which designs and tests alternative payment models in Medicare and Medicaid, has
begun to pay attention to the potential barriers to safety-net participation and success in value-based
payment programs. In response to stakeholder concerns, and to align with their stated focus on health
equity as one of their strategic objectives the innovation center has held at least one roundtable on the
safety-net participation in their models. As these discussions move forward, evidence to guide them will
be essential. This analysis provides evidence supporting the ability of safety-net providers to generate
payment reductions, and findings are in line with findings produced by analyses of the BPCI program,
which found that payment reductions for participants that were safety-net providers were statistically
no different from payment reductions among non-safety nets. Importantly, the same research found
that while payments did not differ, volume changes in certain settings did.135 Taken together, these
findings lead to two important implications. First, payments may not be the appropriate metric to fully
understand differences in provider behavior. Instead, future policy should invest in studies that focus on
cost and utilization, examine the impact of safety-net status on the effect of episode-based payment on
each of those metrics, and use those findings to inform future models. Second, policy should recognize
and devote resources to investigating the importance of model design, specifically in terms of the
methodology employed for the setting of target prices, in determining model outcomes. Moreover, the
potential unintended consequence of disadvantaging safety-net providers, and the vulnerable patients
that they serve, must be explored.
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Appendix A. Excluded Services and Readmissions
Part-B Excluded Services by ICD-09 Code Range
ICD-9 Code

Description

001
002
003
004
005
006
007
008
009
010
011
012
013
014
015
016
017
018
020
021
022
023
024
025
026
027
045
046
047
048
049
050
051
052
053
054
055

Cholera
Typhoid Fever
Salmonella Infections
Shigellosis
Other Bacterial Food Poisoning
Amebiasis
Other Protozoal Intestinal Diseases
Intestinal Infections d/t other Organisms
Ill-defined Intestinal Infections
Primary Tuberculosis Infection
Pulmonary Tuberculosis
Other Respiratory Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis of meninges and Central Nervous
Tuberculosis of intestines, peritoneum and mesenteric glands
Tuberculosis of bone and joints
Tuberculosis of genitourinary system
Tuberculosis of other organs
Miliary Tuberculosis
Plague
Tularemia
Anthrax
Brucellosis
Glanders
Meliodosis
Rat-bite Fever
Other Zoonotic Bacterial Diseases
Acute Poliomyelitis
Other Slow Virus Infections and Prion Diseases of CNS
Menigitis d/t enterovirus
Other Entervirus Diseases of Central Nervous System
Other Non-arthropod-borne Viral Diseases of CNS
Smallpox
Cowpox and paravaccinia
Chickenpox
Herpes Zoster
Herpes simplex
Measles
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056
057
058
059
060
061
062
063
064
065
066
070
071
072
073
074
075
076
077
078
079
080
081
082
083
084
085
086
087
088
090
091
092
093
094
095
096
097
098
099
100

Rubella
Other viral exanthemata
Other human herpesvirus
Other poxvirus infections
Yellow Fever
Dengue
Mosquito-borne viral encephalitis
Tick-borne viral encephalitis
Viral encephalitis transmitted by other and unspecified arthropods
Arthopod-borne hemorrhagic fever
Other arthropod-borne viral diseases
Viral hepatitis
Rabies
Mumps
Ornithosis
Specific diseases d/t Coxsackie virus
Infectious mononucleosis
Trachoma
Other disease of conjunctiva d/t viruses and Chlamydiae
Other disease d/t viruses and Chlamydiae
Viral and chlamydial infection in conditions classified elesewhere and of unspecified site
Louse-borne typhus
Other typhus
Tick-borne rickettsioses
Other rickettsioses
Malaria
Leishmaniasis
Trypanosomiasis
Relapsing fever
Other arthopod-borne diseases
Congenital syphyllis
Early syphyllis, symptomatic
Early syphyllis, latent
Cardiovascular syphyllis
Neurosyphyllis
Other forms of late syphyllis with symptoms
Late syphyllis, latent
Other and unspecified syphyllis
Gonococcal infections
Other veneral diseases
Leptospirosis
114

101
102
103
104
110
111
112
114
115
116
117
118
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140-239
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327

Vincent's angina
Yaws
Pinta
Other spirochetal infections
Dermatophytosis
Dermatomycosis, other and unspecified
Candidiasis
Coccidiodomycosis
Histoplasmosis
Blastomycotic infection
Other mycoses
Opportunisitc mycoses
Schistosomiasis
Other trematode infections
Echinococcosis
Other cescode infection
Trichinosis
Filarial infection and dracontiasis
Ancylostomiasis and necatoriasis
Other intestinal helminthiases
Other and unspecified helminthiases
Intestinal parasitism, unspecified
Toxoplasmosis
Trichomoniasis
Pediculosis and phthirus
Acariasis
Other infestation
Sarcoidosis
Other and unspecified infectious and parasitic diseases
Late effects of tuberculosis
Late effects of poliomyelitis
Late effects of other infectious and parasitic diseases
Neoplasm diagnoses
Bacterial Meningitis
Menigitis d/t other organisms
Meningitis of unspecified cause
Encephalitis, myelitis and encephalomyelitis
Intracranial and intraspinal abscess
Phlebitis and thrombophlebitis of intracranial venous sinuses
Late effects of intracranial abscess or pyogenic infection
Organic sleep disorders
115

360-379
380-389
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
520-529
540-543
600-608
610-612
614-616
617-629
630-679
760-779
800-804
805-809
850-854
940-949
V20-V29
V30-V39
V88
V89
V91

Disorders of the Eye and Adnexa
Disorders of the Ear and Mastoid Process
Deviated nasal septum
Nasal polyps
Chronic pharyngitis and nasophayngitis
Chronis sinusitis
Chronis disease of tonsils and adenoids
Peritonsillar abscess
Chronis laryngitis and laryngotracheitis
Allergic rhinitis
Other disease of upper respiratory tract
Diseases of Oral Cavity, Salivary Glands and Jaws
Appendicitis
Disease of the Male Genital Organs
Disorders of the Breast
Inflammatory Disease of the Female Pelvic Organs
Other Disorders of the Female Genital Tract
Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth and the Puerperium
Certain Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period
Fracture of Skull
Fracture of Neck and Trunk
Intracranial Injury, excluding those with Skull Fracture
Burns
Person Encountering Health Services in Circumstances r/t Reproduction and Development
Liveborn Infants According to Type of Birth
Acquired Absence of Other Organs and Tissue
Other Suspected Conditions Not Found
Multiple Gestation Placenta Status
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Excluded Readmissions by DRG Code
001
002
005
006
007
008
009
010
011
012
013
014
015
016
017
020
021
022
023
024
025
026
027
028
029
030
031
032
033
037
038
039
040
041
042
052
053
054
055
082

Heart Transplant Or Implant Of Heart Assist System W Mcc
Heart Transplant Or Implant Of Heart Assist System W/O Mcc
Liver Transplant W Mcc Or Intestinal Transplant
Liver Transplant W/O Mcc
Lung Transplant
Simultaneous Pancreas/Kidney Transplant
Bone Marrow Transplant
Pancreas Transplant
Tracheostomy For Face,Mouth & Neck Diagnoses W Mcc
Tracheostomy For Face,Mouth & Neck Diagnoses W Cc
Tracheostomy For Face,Mouth & Neck Diagnoses W/O Cc/Mcc
Allogeneic Bone Marrow Transplant
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant W Cc/Mcc
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant W/O Cc/Mcc
Intracranial Vascular Procedures W Pdx Hemorrhage W Mcc
Intracranial Vascular Procedures W Pdx Hemorrhage W Cc
Intracranial Vascular Procedures W Pdx Hemorrhage W/O Cc/Mcc
Cranio W Major Dev Impl/Acute Complex Cns Pdx W Mcc Or Chemo Implant
Cranio W Major Dev Impl/Acute Complex Cns Pdx W/O Mcc
Craniotomy & Endovascular Intracranial Procedures W Mcc
Craniotomy & Endovascular Intracranial Procedures W Cc
Craniotomy & Endovascular Intracranial Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Spinal Procedures W Mcc
Spinal Procedures W Cc Or Spinal Neurostimulators
Spinal Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Ventricular Shunt Procedures W Mcc
Ventricular Shunt Procedures W Cc
Ventricular Shunt Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Extracranial Procedures W Mcc
Extracranial Procedures W Cc
Extracranial Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Periph/Cranial Nerve & Other Nerv Syst Proc W Mcc
Periph/Cranial Nerve & Other Nerv Syst Proc W Cc Or Periph Neurostim
Periph/Cranial Nerve & Other Nerv Syst Proc W/O Cc/Mcc
Spinal Disorders & Injuries W Cc/Mcc
Spinal Disorders & Injuries W/O Cc/Mcc
Nervous System Neoplasms W Mcc
Nervous System Neoplasms W/O Mcc
Traumatic Stupor & Coma, Coma >1 Hr W Mcc
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083
084
085
086
087
088
089
090
113
114
115
116
117
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
146
147
148
163
164
165
180
181
182
183
184
185
216
217
218
219
220

Traumatic Stupor & Coma, Coma >1 Hr W Cc
Traumatic Stupor & Coma, Coma >1 Hr W/O Cc/Mcc
Traumatic Stupor & Coma, Coma <1 Hr W Mcc
Traumatic Stupor & Coma, Coma <1 Hr W Cc
Traumatic Stupor & Coma, Coma <1 Hr W/O Cc/Mcc
Concussion W Mcc
Concussion W Cc
Concussion W/O Cc/Mcc
Orbital Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Orbital Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Extraocular Procedures Except Orbit
Intraocular Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Intraocular Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Major Head & Neck Procedures W Cc/Mcc Or Major Device
Major Head & Neck Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Cranial/Facial Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Cranial/Facial Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Other Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat O.R. Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Other Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat O.R. Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Sinus & Mastoid Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Sinus & Mastoid Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Mouth Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Mouth Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Salivary Gland Procedures
Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat Malignancy W Mcc
Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat Malignancy W Cc
Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat Malignancy W/O Cc/Mcc
Major Chest Procedures W Mcc
Major Chest Procedures W Cc
Major Chest Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Respiratory Neoplasms W Mcc
Respiratory Neoplasms W Cc
Respiratory Neoplasms W/O Cc/Mcc
Major Chest Trauma W Mcc
Major Chest Trauma W Cc
Major Chest Trauma W/O Cc/Mcc
Cardiac Valve & Oth Maj Cardiothoracic Proc W Card Cath W Mcc
Cardiac Valve & Oth Maj Cardiothoracic Proc W Card Cath W Cc
Cardiac Valve & Oth Maj Cardiothoracic Proc W Card Cath W/O Cc/Mcc
Cardiac Valve & Oth Maj Cardiothoracic Proc W/O Card Cath W Mcc
Cardiac Valve & Oth Maj Cardiothoracic Proc W/O Card Cath W Cc
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221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
237
238
242
243
244
245
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335

Cardiac Valve & Oth Maj Cardiothoracic Proc W/O Card Cath W/O Cc/Mcc
Cardiac Defib Implant W Cardiac Cath W Ami/Hf/Shock W Mcc
Cardiac Defib Implant W Cardiac Cath W Ami/Hf/Shock W/O Mcc
Cardiac Defib Implant W Cardiac Cath W/O Ami/Hf/Shock W Mcc
Cardiac Defib Implant W Cardiac Cath W/O Ami/Hf/Shock W/O Mcc
Cardiac Defibrillator Implant W/O Cardiac Cath W Mcc
Cardiac Defibrillator Implant W/O Cardiac Cath W/O Mcc
Other Cardiothoracic Procedures W Mcc
Other Cardiothoracic Procedures W Cc
Other Cardiothoracic Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Major Cardiovasc Procedures W Mcc
Major Cardiovasc Procedures W/O Mcc
Permanent Cardiac Pacemaker Implant W Mcc
Permanent Cardiac Pacemaker Implant W Cc
Permanent Cardiac Pacemaker Implant W/O Cc/Mcc
Aicd Generator Procedures
Cardiac Pacemaker Device Replacement W Mcc
Cardiac Pacemaker Device Replacement W/O Mcc
Cardiac Pacemaker Revision Except Device Replacement W Mcc
Cardiac Pacemaker Revision Except Device Replacement W Cc
Cardiac Pacemaker Revision Except Device Replacement W/O Cc/Mcc
Vein Ligation & Stripping
Other Circulatory System O.R. Procedures
Aicd Lead Procedures
Endovascular Cardiac Valve Replacement W Mcc
Endovascular Cardiac Valve Replacement W/O Mcc
Aortic And Heart Assist Procedures Except Pulsation Balloon W Mcc
Aortic And Heart Assist Procedures Except Pulsation Balloon W/O Mcc
Other Major Cardiovascular Procedures W Mcc
Other Major Cardiovascular Procedures W Cc
Other Major Cardiovascular Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Stomach, Esophageal & Duodenal Proc W Mcc
Stomach, Esophageal & Duodenal Proc W Cc
Stomach, Esophageal & Duodenal Proc W/O Cc/Mcc
Major Small & Large Bowel Procedures W Mcc
Major Small & Large Bowel Procedures W Cc
Major Small & Large Bowel Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Rectal Resection W Mcc
Rectal Resection W Cc
Rectal Resection W/O Cc/Mcc
Peritoneal Adhesiolysis W Mcc
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336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
374
375
376
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422

Peritoneal Adhesiolysis W Cc
Peritoneal Adhesiolysis W/O Cc/Mcc
Appendectomy W Complicated Principal Diag W Mcc
Appendectomy W Complicated Principal Diag W Cc
Appendectomy W Complicated Principal Diag W/O Cc/Mcc
Appendectomy W/O Complicated Principal Diag W Mcc
Appendectomy W/O Complicated Principal Diag W Cc
Appendectomy W/O Complicated Principal Diag W/O Cc/Mcc
Minor Small & Large Bowel Procedures W Mcc
Minor Small & Large Bowel Procedures W Cc
Minor Small & Large Bowel Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Anal & Stomal Procedures W Mcc
Anal & Stomal Procedures W Cc
Anal & Stomal Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Inguinal & Femoral Hernia Procedures W Mcc
Inguinal & Femoral Hernia Procedures W Cc
Inguinal & Femoral Hernia Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Hernia Procedures Except Inguinal & Femoral W Mcc
Hernia Procedures Except Inguinal & Femoral W Cc
Hernia Procedures Except Inguinal & Femoral W/O Cc/Mcc
Digestive Malignancy W Mcc
Digestive Malignancy W Cc
Digestive Malignancy W/O Cc/Mcc
Pancreas, Liver & Shunt Procedures W Mcc
Pancreas, Liver & Shunt Procedures W Cc
Pancreas, Liver & Shunt Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Biliary Tract Proc Except Only Cholecyst W Or W/O C.D.E. W Mcc
Biliary Tract Proc Except Only Cholecyst W Or W/O C.D.E. W Cc
Biliary Tract Proc Except Only Cholecyst W Or W/O C.D.E. W/O Cc/Mcc
Cholecystectomy W C.D.E. W Mcc
Cholecystectomy W C.D.E. W Cc
Cholecystectomy W C.D.E. W/O Cc/Mcc
Cholecystectomy Except By Laparoscope W/O C.D.E. W Mcc
Cholecystectomy Except By Laparoscope W/O C.D.E. W Cc
Cholecystectomy Except By Laparoscope W/O C.D.E. W/O Cc/Mcc
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy W/O C.D.E. W Mcc
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy W/O C.D.E. W Cc
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy W/O C.D.E. W/O Cc/Mcc
Hepatobiliary Diagnostic Procedures W Mcc
Hepatobiliary Diagnostic Procedures W Cc
Hepatobiliary Diagnostic Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
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423
424
425
435
436
437
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
469
470
471
472
473
490
491
506
507
508
510
511
512
513
514
518
519
520
542
543
544
582
583
584
585
597
598

Other Hepatobiliary Or Pancreas O.R. Procedures W Mcc
Other Hepatobiliary Or Pancreas O.R. Procedures W Cc
Other Hepatobiliary Or Pancreas O.R. Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Malignancy Of Hepatobiliary System Or Pancreas W Mcc
Malignancy Of Hepatobiliary System Or Pancreas W Cc
Malignancy Of Hepatobiliary System Or Pancreas W/O Cc/Mcc
Combined Anterior/Posterior Spinal Fusion W Mcc
Combined Anterior/Posterior Spinal Fusion W Cc
Combined Anterior/Posterior Spinal Fusion W/O Cc/Mcc
Spinal Fus Exc Cerv W Spinal Curv/Malig/Infec Or 9+ Fus W Mcc
Spinal Fus Exc Cerv W Spinal Curv/Malig/Infec Or 9+ Fus W Cc
Spinal Fus Exc Cerv W Spinal Curv/Malig/Infec Or 9+ Fus W/O Cc/Mcc
Spinal Fusion Except Cervical W Mcc
Spinal Fusion Except Cervical W/O Mcc
Major Joint Replacement Or Reattachment Of Lower Extremity W Mcc
Major Joint Replacement Or Reattachment Of Lower Extremity W/O Mcc
Cervical Spinal Fusion W Mcc
Cervical Spinal Fusion W Cc
Cervical Spinal Fusion W/O Cc/Mcc
Back & Neck Proc Exc Spinal Fusion W Cc/Mcc Or Disc Device/Neurostim
Back & Neck Proc Exc Spinal Fusion W/O Cc/Mcc
Major Thumb Or Joint Procedures
Major Shoulder Or Elbow Joint Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Major Shoulder Or Elbow Joint Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Shoulder,Elbow Or Forearm Proc,Exc Major Joint Proc W Mcc
Shoulder,Elbow Or Forearm Proc,Exc Major Joint Proc W Cc
Shoulder,Elbow Or Forearm Proc,Exc Major Joint Proc W/O Cc/Mcc
Hand Or Wrist Proc, Except Major Thumb Or Joint Proc W Cc/Mcc
Hand Or Wrist Proc, Except Major Thumb Or Joint Proc W/O Cc/Mcc
Back & Neck Proc Exc Spinal Fusion W Mcc Or Disc Device/Neurostim
Back & Neck Proc Exc Spinal Fusion W Cc
Back & Neck Proc Exc Spinal Fusion W/O Cc/Mcc
Pathological Fractures & Musculoskelet & Conn Tiss Malig W Mcc
Pathological Fractures & Musculoskelet & Conn Tiss Malig W Cc
Pathological Fractures & Musculoskelet & Conn Tiss Malig W/O Cc/Mcc
Mastectomy For Malignancy W Cc/Mcc
Mastectomy For Malignancy W/O Cc/Mcc
Breast Biopsy, Local Excision & Other Breast Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Breast Biopsy, Local Excision & Other Breast Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Malignant Breast Disorders W Mcc
Malignant Breast Disorders W Cc
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599
604
605
614
615
619
620
621
625
626
627
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
686
687
688
707
708
709
710
711
712

Malignant Breast Disorders W/O Cc/Mcc
Trauma To The Skin, Subcut Tiss & Breast W Mcc
Trauma To The Skin, Subcut Tiss & Breast W/O Mcc
Adrenal & Pituitary Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Adrenal & Pituitary Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
O.R. Procedures For Obesity W Mcc
O.R. Procedures For Obesity W Cc
O.R. Procedures For Obesity W/O Cc/Mcc
Thyroid, Parathyroid & Thyroglossal Procedures W Mcc
Thyroid, Parathyroid & Thyroglossal Procedures W Cc
Thyroid, Parathyroid & Thyroglossal Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Kidney Transplant
Major Bladder Procedures W Mcc
Major Bladder Procedures W Cc
Major Bladder Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Kidney & Ureter Procedures For Neoplasm W Mcc
Kidney & Ureter Procedures For Neoplasm W Cc
Kidney & Ureter Procedures For Neoplasm W/O Cc/Mcc
Kidney & Ureter Procedures For Non-Neoplasm W Mcc
Kidney & Ureter Procedures For Non-Neoplasm W Cc
Kidney & Ureter Procedures For Non-Neoplasm W/O Cc/Mcc
Minor Bladder Procedures W Mcc
Minor Bladder Procedures W Cc
Minor Bladder Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Prostatectomy W Mcc
Prostatectomy W Cc
Prostatectomy W/O Cc/Mcc
Transurethral Procedures W Mcc
Transurethral Procedures W Cc
Transurethral Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Urethral Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Urethral Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Kidney & Urinary Tract Neoplasms W Mcc
Kidney & Urinary Tract Neoplasms W Cc
Kidney & Urinary Tract Neoplasms W/O Cc/Mcc
Major Male Pelvic Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Major Male Pelvic Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Penis Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Penis Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Testes Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Testes Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
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713
714
715
716
717
718
722
723
724
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
754
755
756
765
766
767
768
769
770
799
800
801
814
815
816

Transurethral Prostatectomy W Cc/Mcc
Transurethral Prostatectomy W/O Cc/Mcc
Other Male Reproductive System O.R. Proc For Malignancy W Cc/Mcc
Other Male Reproductive System O.R. Proc For Malignancy W/O Cc/Mcc
Other Male Reproductive System O.R. Proc Exc Malignancy W Cc/Mcc
Other Male Reproductive System O.R. Proc Exc Malignancy W/O Cc/Mcc
Malignancy, Male Reproductive System W Mcc
Malignancy, Male Reproductive System W Cc
Malignancy, Male Reproductive System W/O Cc/Mcc
Pelvic Evisceration, Rad Hysterectomy & Rad Vulvectomy W Cc/Mcc
Pelvic Evisceration, Rad Hysterectomy & Rad Vulvectomy W/O Cc/Mcc
Uterine & Adnexa Proc For Ovarian Or Adnexal Malignancy W Mcc
Uterine & Adnexa Proc For Ovarian Or Adnexal Malignancy W Cc
Uterine & Adnexa Proc For Ovarian Or Adnexal Malignancy W/O Cc/Mcc
Uterine,Adnexa Proc For Non-Ovarian/Adnexal Malig W Mcc
Uterine,Adnexa Proc For Non-Ovarian/Adnexal Malig W Cc
Uterine,Adnexa Proc For Non-Ovarian/Adnexal Malig W/O Cc/Mcc
Uterine & Adnexa Proc For Non-Malignancy W Cc/Mcc
Uterine & Adnexa Proc For Non-Malignancy W/O Cc/Mcc
D&C, Conization, Laparoscopy & Tubal Interruption W Cc/Mcc
D&C, Conization, Laparoscopy & Tubal Interruption W/O Cc/Mcc
Vagina, Cervix & Vulva Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Vagina, Cervix & Vulva Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Female Reproductive System Reconstructive Procedures
Other Female Reproductive System O.R. Procedures W Cc/Mcc
Other Female Reproductive System O.R. Procedures W/O Cc/Mcc
Malignancy, Female Reproductive System W Mcc
Malignancy, Female Reproductive System W Cc
Malignancy, Female Reproductive System W/O Cc/Mcc
Cesarean Section W Cc/Mcc
Cesarean Section W/O Cc/Mcc
Vaginal Delivery W Sterilization &/Or D&C
Vaginal Delivery W O.R. Proc Except Steril &/Or D&C
Postpartum & Post Abortion Diagnoses W O.R. Procedure
Abortion W D&C, Aspiration Curettage Or Hysterotomy
Splenectomy W Mcc
Splenectomy W Cc
Splenectomy W/O Cc/Mcc
Reticuloendothelial & Immunity Disorders W Mcc
Reticuloendothelial & Immunity Disorders W Cc
Reticuloendothelial & Immunity Disorders W/O Cc/Mcc
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820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
876
906
913
914
927
928
929
933
934
935
955
956
957
958

Lymphoma & Leukemia W Major O.R. Procedure W Mcc
Lymphoma & Leukemia W Major O.R. Procedure W Cc
Lymphoma & Leukemia W Major O.R. Procedure W/O Cc/Mcc
Lymphoma & Non-Acute Leukemia W Other O.R. Proc W Mcc
Lymphoma & Non-Acute Leukemia W Other O.R. Proc W Cc
Lymphoma & Non-Acute Leukemia W Other O.R. Proc W/O Cc/Mcc
Myeloprolif Disord Or Poorly Diff Neopl W Maj O.R. Proc W Mcc
Myeloprolif Disord Or Poorly Diff Neopl W Maj O.R. Proc W Cc
Myeloprolif Disord Or Poorly Diff Neopl W Maj O.R. Proc W/O Cc/Mcc
Myeloprolif Disord Or Poorly Diff Neopl W Other O.R. Proc W Cc/Mcc
Myeloprolif Disord Or Poorly Diff Neopl W Other O.R. Proc W/O Cc/Mcc
Acute Leukemia W/O Major O.R. Procedure W Mcc
Acute Leukemia W/O Major O.R. Procedure W Cc
Acute Leukemia W/O Major O.R. Procedure W/O Cc/Mcc
Chemo W Acute Leukemia As Sdx Or W High Dose Chemo Agent W Mcc
Chemo W Acute Leukemia As Sdx W Cc Or High Dose Chemo Agent
Chemo W Acute Leukemia As Sdx W/O Cc/Mcc
Lymphoma & Non-Acute Leukemia W Mcc
Lymphoma & Non-Acute Leukemia W Cc
Lymphoma & Non-Acute Leukemia W/O Cc/Mcc
Other Myeloprolif Dis Or Poorly Diff Neopl Diag W Mcc
Other Myeloprolif Dis Or Poorly Diff Neopl Diag W Cc
Other Myeloprolif Dis Or Poorly Diff Neopl Diag W/O Cc/Mcc
Chemotherapy W/O Acute Leukemia As Secondary Diagnosis W Mcc
Chemotherapy W/O Acute Leukemia As Secondary Diagnosis W Cc
Chemotherapy W/O Acute Leukemia As Secondary Diagnosis W/O Cc/Mcc
Radiotherapy
O.R. Procedure W Principal Diagnoses Of Mental Illness
Hand Procedures For Injuries
Traumatic Injury W Mcc
Traumatic Injury W/O Mcc
Extensive Burns Or Full Thickness Burns W Mv 96+ Hrs W Skin Graft
Full Thickness Burn W Skin Graft Or Inhal Inj W Cc/Mcc
Full Thickness Burn W Skin Graft Or Inhal Inj W/O Cc/Mcc
Extensive Burns Or Full Thickness Burns W Mv 96+ Hrs W/O Skin Graft
Full Thickness Burn W/O Skin Grft Or Inhal Inj
Non-Extensive Burns
Craniotomy For Multiple Significant Trauma
Limb Reattachment, Hip & Femur Proc For Multiple Significant Trauma
Other O.R. Procedures For Multiple Significant Trauma W Mcc
Other O.R. Procedures For Multiple Significant Trauma W Cc
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959
963
964
965
969
970
984
985
986

Other O.R. Procedures For Multiple Significant Trauma W/O Cc/Mcc
Other Multiple Significant Trauma W Mcc
Other Multiple Significant Trauma W Cc
Other Multiple Significant Trauma W/O Cc/Mcc
Hiv W Extensive O.R. Procedure W Mcc
Hiv W Extensive O.R. Procedure W/O Mcc
Prostatic O.R. Procedure Unrelated To Principal Diagnosis W Mcc
Prostatic O.R. Procedure Unrelated To Principal Diagnosis W Cc
Prostatic O.R. Procedure Unrelated To Principal Diagnosis W/O Cc/Mcc
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Appendix B. Calculation of Price Standardized Payments
Inpatient acute care claims
Price Standardized Payment= (Operating Base Rate + Capital Base Rate) X DRG Weight X
Transfer Fraction + Operating Outlier Amount + Capital Outlier Amount + New Tech Payment
+Clotting Factor Payment
Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility (IRF) claims, IPF, LTCH
Price Standardized Payment = (Claim Payment amount – Capital DSH Payments - Operating DSH
Payments – Capital IME Payments - Operating IME payments + Inpatient Deductible + Blood
Deductible +Beneficiary Coinsurance) / ((Labor Ratio * Wage Index) + Non-labor ratio)
Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Payments (Note, payments to CAHs are not wage adjusted)
Price Standardized Payment = Claim Payment Amount + Inpatient Deductible + Patient
Coinsurance
Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) Payments
Price Standardized Payment = (Claim Payment amount + Inpatient Deductible + Blood
Deductible +Beneficiary Coinsurance) / ((Labor Ratio * Wage Index) + Non-labor ratio)
Home Health (HH) Payments, Hospice Payments
Price Standardized Payment = Claim Payment Amount / ((Labor Ratio* Wage Index) + Non-labor
ratio)
Durable Medical Equipment
Price standardized Payment = Applicable DME Fee Schedule Payment Rate or Line Allowed
Charge Amount
Physician Fee Schedule Claims
Price Standardized Payment=Applicable Physician Fee Schedule Payment Amount
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Outpatient Hospital Claims
Price Standardized Payment = (Claim Payment amount + Part B Deductible + Beneficiary
Coinsurance) / ((Labor Ratio * Wage Index) + Non-labor ratio)
Ambulance Payment
Price Standardized Payment = Ambulance base payment rate* Units
Ambulatory Surgical Center Payments
Price Standardized Payment=ASC payment Rate * Units
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